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ABSTRACT
This Article considers the intersection between law, humiliation and
shame, and how the law has the capacity to allow for, encourage, or (in
some cases) remediate humiliation, or humiliating or shaming behavior.
The need for new attention to be paid to this question has increased
exponentially as society begins to also take international human rights
mandates
more
seriously,
especially-although
certainly
not
exclusively-in the context of the recently-ratified United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, a convention that
calls for "respect for inherent dignity," and characterizes "discrimination
against any person on the basis of disability [as] a violation of the inherent
dignity and worth of the human person .... "
Humiliation and shaming contravene basic fundamental human
rights and raise important constitutional questions implicating the due
process and equal protection clauses. Humiliation and shaming practices
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*** Senior Attorney, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Appellate Division, First Judicial
Department, New York. J.D. 2010, New York Law School; B.A. 2006, Tufts University.
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include "scarlet letter"-like criminal sanctions, police stop-and-frisk
practices, the treatment of persons with mental disabilities in the justice
system, and the use of sex offender registries. Humiliation and shame are
detrimental in ways that lead to recidivism, inhibit rehabilitation,
discourage treatment, and injure victims. They also directly contravene the
guiding principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, especially in the context of
its relationship to the importance of dignity in the law, and potentially
violate international human rights law principles as well.
This Article explores how humiliation and shaming harm all
participants in the legal system and the law itself. It urges that the
techniques be banned, and that this ban will enhance dignity for the entire
legal system and society as a whole. First, the Article considers the
meaning of shame and humiliation. Then, it briefly discusses principles of
therapeutic jurisprudence and its relationship to the significance of dignity,
and considers recent developments in international human rights law, both
of which are valuable interpretive tools in this conversation. Next, it looks
at how the United States Supreme Court has considered these concepts in
recent cases. Following this, it studies several relevant areas of law and
policy from the perspective of how overt shaming is employed: scarlet
letter punishments, use of the police power, treatment of institutionalized
persons with mental disabilities and elders, and sex offender registry law.
Then, using a therapeutic jurisprudence filter and drawing on international
human rights law principles, it examines why these shaming tactics are
contrary to bedrock principles of the legal system: the mandates to honor
dignity, to minimize recidivism, and to enhance rehabilitation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, Professor Robert Cover famously wrote that the
"principle by which legal meaning proliferates in all communities never
exists in isolation from violence."' Scholars have spent the past three
decades plumbing the depths of what Cover wrote, and applying it to a
vast range of legal topics. 2 Cover's theories on law and violence have
greatly influenced legal academia. 3
In one of Cover's most important articles, he briefly discussed the
relationship between shame and violence, noting: "[t]here are societies in

1

Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term. Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 40 (1983).
2

See, e.g., Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 Tex. L. Rev. I, 74 n.516 (2009)
(discussing Cover's Nomos and Narrative while investigating originalism); Lynne Henderson,
Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 661ND. L.J. 379,404 (1991) (discussing Cover's Nomos
and Narrative and its application to the law); Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What's Disability
Studies Got to Do with it or an Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 403, 433 n.I02 (2011) (discussing Cover's Nomos and Narrative while investigating the
power of language).
3
See, e.g., Daniel Ross Goodman, Towards a Moral Values Paradigm in False-Speech
Adjudication, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 71, 74-75 (2013) ("In his important and influential essay
Nomos and Narrative, Robert Cover memorably distinguished the creative and constrictive
interpretations of the Supreme Court as 'jurisgcncrativc' and 'jurispathic."); Nomi M.
Stolzcnbcrg, Un-Covering the Tradition of Jewish "Dissimilation": Frankfurter, Bickel, and
Cover on Judicial Review, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 809, 812 (1994) (noting the influence of
Cover's Nomos and Narrative); Beverly Horsburgh, Recent Development, Lifting the Veil of
Secrecy: Domestic Violence in the Jewish Community, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 213 (1995)
(noting that Cover is a "highly influential scholar").
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which contrition or shame control defendants' behavior to a greater extent
than does violence. Such societies require and have received their own
distinctive form of analysis."4 This Article's authors believe that, on
many levels, our society has become one in which shame-along with
violence-is used as a modality to control defendants' (and other
litigants') behavior. This Article thus seeks to address the intersection
between law, humiliation and shame, and how the law has the capacity to
allow for, encourage, or (in some cases) remediate humiliating or shaming
behavior. 5 This intersection is a collateral issue that has not been the topic
of nearly as much attention as has the intersection between law and
violence, but is one that must be examined if the dignitarian values that the
law optimally expresses are to be taken seriously. 6 This issue's need for
new attention has increased exponentially as society begins to also take
international human rights mandates more seriously, especially in the
context of the recently ratified United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD"). 7 That convention calls for "respect
for inherent dignity," 8 and characterizes "discrimination against any
person on the basis of disability [as] a violation of the inherent dignity and

4

Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1607 (1986).

5

See generally SHAME: INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE (Paul
Gilbert & Bernice Andrews cds., 1998) (discussing the concept of shame). See also Toni M.
Massaro, The Meaning of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PYSCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
645, 648 (1997) (discussing the role of shame in legal reforms); Walter J. Torres & Raymond M.
Bergner, Humiliation: Its Nature and Consequences, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 195,
199 (20 I 0) (analyzing the structure of humiliation).
6

MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 100--06 (2013) (discussing dignity in the law and criminal justice
system); Michael Perlin, "There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden": Mental Health

Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dignity, and the Promise of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in COERCIVE CARE: LAW AND POLICY 193, 217 (Bernadette
McSherry & Jan Frccklcton, cds., 2013) [hereinafter Perlin, Gates of Eden] (discussing how
dignity plays a role in mental health law); Michael L. Perlin, Understanding the Intersection
Between International Human Rights and Mental Disability Law: The Role of Dignity, in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE STUDIES 191, 194 (Bruce
Arrigo & Heather Bcrsot, cds., 2014) [hereinafter Perlin, The Role of Dignity] (discussing the
role of dignity in law); Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran,
Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
61 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin, Dignity Was the First to Leave] (discussing how dignity is a
prerequisite for a constitutionally fair trial); Michael L. Perlin, "The Judge, He Cast His Robe
Aside": Mental Health Courts, Dignity and Due Process, 3 J. MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL'Y J. I,
20-21 (20 13) [hereinafter Perlin, Cast His Robe] (discussing the role of dignity in the law).
7

G.A. Res. 61/611, U.N. GAOR, 6lst Scss., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/61/611 (Dec. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter CRPD].

8

!d. at 4.

2014]

FRIEND TO THE MARTYR

5

worth of the human person." 9
Humiliation and shaming contravene basic fundamental human
rights and raise important constitutional questions implicating the due
process and equal protection clauses. 10 Humiliation and shaming practices
include "scarlet letter" criminal sanctions, 11 police stop-and-frisk
practices, 12 the treatment of persons with mental disabilities in the justice
system, 13 and the use of sex offender registries. 14 Moreover, humiliation
and shame are detrimental in ways that lead to recidivism, 15 inhibit
rehabilitation, 16 discourage treatment, 17 and injure victims. 18 These
practices also directly contravene the guiding principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence ("TJ"), especially in the context of its relationship to the
importance of dignity in the law, 19 and potentially violate international
human rights law principles.Z0
In recent years, scholars and activists from multiple disciplines
have begun to devote themselves to the study of humiliation and how it
robs the legal system and society of dignity. 21 The Human Dignity and
Humiliation Studies Network explicitly underscores this in its mandate:
"We wish to stimulate systemic change, globally and locally, to open
space for dignity and mutual respect and esteem to take root and grow,
thus ending humiliating practices and breaking cycles of humiliation

9
/d. at 2. Sec also Raymond Lang, The United Nations Convention on the Rights and Dignities
for Persons with Disabilities: A Panacea for Ending Disability Discrimination?, 3 ALTER:
EUR. J. DISABILITY RES. 266, 273 (2009) (discussing how dignity is the first "fundamental
axiom" upon which the convention is premised).
10
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.").
11
See infra Part IV.A.
12
See infra Part IV.B.
13
See infra Part IV .E.
14
See infra text accompanying notes 252-312.
15
See infra text accompanying notes 269-93.
16
See infra text accompanying notes 280-90.
17
See infra text accompanying notes 308-11.
18
See infra text accompanying note 326.
19
See infra Part V.
20
See infra Part Ill.
21
See, e.g., Welcome to Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies, HUMAN DIGNITY AND
HUMILIATION STUDIES (2014), http://www.humiliationstudics.org/ (last visited Scp. 4, 2014)
("We arc a global transdisciplinary network and fellowship of concerned academics and
practitioners. We wish to stimulate systemic change, globally and locally, to open space for
dignity, for mutual respect and esteem to take root and grow, thus ending humiliating practices
and breaking cycles of humiliation throughout the world.").
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throughout the world." 22
This Article's title comes in part from Bob Dylan's 1983 song
"Jokerman."23 In the most elaborate discussion of the song's meaning, the
critic Michael Gray points out that it "insist[ s] that 'evil' is not 'out there,'
'among the others,' but is inside us all, and that all progress, individual
and social, must be built upon coming to terms with this literally
inescapable, fundamental truth." 24 Some verses after the "friend to the
woman of shame" line, Dylan sang, "False-hearted judges dying in the
webs that they spin, only a matter of time 'til the night comes stepping
in."25 Shaming litigants-the men and women of shame-is often the
work of such "false-hearted judges," and the result of these shaming and
humiliating tactics is often a reflection of the evil that is, in Gray's words,
"inside us all." 26 We believe that these words are crucial to understanding
the legal issues discussed here.
This Article explores how humiliation and shaming are bad for all
participants in the legal system and the law itself. It urges that humiliating
and shaming techniques be banned in order to enhance dignity for society
and the legal system. In Section I, the Article considers the meanings of
shame and humiliation. Then, it briefly discusses principles of TJ, its
relationship to the significance of dignity, and recent developments in
international human rights law in Section II. Section III discusses
international human rights law and the CRPD. Next, the Article considers
how the United States Supreme Court has evaluated these concepts in
recent cases in Section IV. Next, the Article examines several relevant
areas of law and policy from the perspective of how overt shaming is
employed through scarlet letter punishments, use of the police power,
treatment of institutionalized persons with mental disabilities, treatment of
elders, and sex offender registry laws. Then, using a TJ filter and drawing
on international human rights law principles, Section V considers why
these shaming tactics are contrary to bedrock principles of the legal
system, including the mandates to honor dignity, minimize recidivism, and
enhance rehabilitation. Section VI concludes.

22
23

/d.

BOB DYLAN, Jokcnnan, on INFIDELS (Columbia Records 1983).
MICHAEL GRAY, THE DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 364 (2008).
25
Dylan, supra note 23.
26
See GRAY, supra note 24, at 362 (reflecting Dylan's focus on shame, and how evil can be
internalized as well as externalized).
24
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II. WHAT IS SHAME?
Shame is a difficult concept to understand. "Shame is bordered by
embarrassment, humiliation, and mortification, in porous ways that are
difficult to predict or contain,"27 and it is "one of the most important,
painful and intensive of all emotions."28 Although each person reacts
differently to shame, 29 there is uncontested uniformity among "the selfshattering pain that shame can produce in an individual," even when the
"experience may vary widely among individuals."30 "Shame is considered
to be more painful than guilt because one's core self-not simply one's
behavior-is at stake." 31 Typically, scholars note how sexual abuse can
cause such reactions, 32 but the range of behaviors is far wider, including,
but certainly not limited to, college hazing, 33 societal response to
transgendered individuals,34 and online invasions of privacy. 35 According
to Professor Martha Nussbaum, when "shame is a large part of their
problem ... expos[ing] that person to humiliation may often shatter the
all-too-fragile defenses of the person's ego. The result might be utter
collapse. " 36
Like shame, humiliation can be difficult to abstractly

27

Massaro, supra note 5, at 655.
Robert Svensson et al., Moral Emotions and Offending: Do Feelings of Anticipated Shame
and Guilt Mediate the Effect of Socializing on Offending?, I 0 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 2, 3 (20 12).
28

29
30

31

Massaro, supra note 5, at 656.
!d. at 661.
June Price Tangney et al., Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY

345, 349 (2007).
32

See Jennifer Ann Drobac, Wake Up and Smell the Starbucks Coffee: How Doc v. Starbucks
Confirms the End of "The Age of Consent" in California and Perhaps Beyond, 33 B.C. J.L. &
Soc. JUST. I, 13 (2013) (discussing how the American Academy of Child & Adolescent

Psychiatry has explained that children and adolescent victims "commonly conceal the
perpetrator's offenses based on feelings of shame, fear, humiliation, and vulnerability"); Claudio
Ncgrao II ct al., Shame, Humiliation, and Childhood Sexual Abuse: Distinct Contributions and
Emotional Coherence, I 0 CHILD MALTREATMENT 350, 351 (2005) (discussing shame among
childhood sexual abuse survivors).
33

Claire Wright, Torture at Home: Borrowing from the Torture Convention to Define Domestic
Violence, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 457, 556-57 (2013).
34
See Amy D. Ronner, Let's Get the "Trans" and "Sex" Out of It and Free Us All, 16
WOMEN'S J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 859, 908 n.326 (quoting Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male
and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265,
295 ( 1999) (discussing shame in the lack of choice for gender identification)).
35

Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, I 04 Nw. U. L. REV. 477, 504 (20 I 0).

36

Michael Lee Dynes & Henry Edward Whitmer, The Scarlet Letter of the Law: A Place for
Shaming Punishments in Arizona, 6 PHOENIX L. REV. 513, 524 (2013) (quoting Martha C.
Nussbaum, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 236 (2004)).

8
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conceptualize. Broadly, humiliation has been defined as "the rejection of
human beings as human, that is, treating people as if they were not human
beings but merely things, tools, animals, subhumans, or inferior
37
humans." Humiliation can also reflect "a loss of control over one's
38
identity,"
or "being denied a certain status in communion with
39
others. " Because of humiliation's damaging effects, "[a] civilized society
4
Certainly,
is one whose members do not humiliate one another."
apology may have a role in remediating shame and humiliation. In his
book, On Apology, Aaron Lazare notes:

°

Apologies have the power to heal humiliations and grudges, remove the
desire for vengeance, and generate forgiveness on the part of the
offended parties. For the offender, they can diminish the fear of
retaliation and relieve the guilt and shame that can grip the mind with a
persistence and tenacity that are hard to ignore. 41
The use of humiliation techniques, whether done in overt or passive
ways, violates rights to due process, privacy, and freedom from cruel and
42
unusual punishment. By marginalizing the rights of those who are
43
shamed and humiliated, such individuals are treated as less than human.
Indeed, the entire legal process has the capacity to shame. Luther
Munford, a practicing attorney, highlighted the inherent potential in the
legal process for humiliation and shame:
As one researcher has written, 'few psychotherapists or litigants are truly
prepared for the forces of aggression that are released and sanctioned by
our judicial system.' Litigation presents the ultimate psychological threat
because it puts each party's integrity at issue. A person who is sued fears
a judgment that will bankrupt him. Even if that does not happen, he may

37

Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, Ill HARV. L. REV. 445, 487 n.266
(1997) (quoting Avishai Margalit, THE DECENT SOCIETY I (1996)).

38

Claire Wright, Censoring the Censors in the WTO: Reconciling the Communitarian and
Human Rights Theories of international Law, 3 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 17, 102 n.534 (2010)
(citing JACK KATZ, SEDUCTION OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS IN DOING
EVIL 24 (1988)).
39
Frank Haldcmann, Another Kind of Justice: Transitional Justice as Recognition, 41 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 675, 691 n.l20 (2008) (citing Axel Honncth, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE
MORAL GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS 131-39 (Joel Anderson trans., 1995)).
40
Margalit, supra note 3 7, at I.
41
Aaron Lazare, ON APOLOGY I (2004); cf Richard B. Bildcr, The Role of Apology in
International Law and Diplomacy, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 441 (2006) (noting that apologies can
be used for negative means as "stronger states have coerced apologies from weaker states or
peoples as expressions of dominance or means of humiliation").
42

43

See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 489-90 (discussing the damaging nature of humiliation).
/d.
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not be able to get a loan or change jobs while the lawsuit is pending. A
suit against a professional assaults his professional competence or even
morality. On the other hand, a person who sues fears the rejection and
humiliation that accompany a courtroom defeat. 44
Subsequently, Munford noted that litigation "keeps the injury alive
and present" in such a way that "discussion of personal matters in public
testimony may shame [the litigant]," leading to greater negative
consequences. 45
In the next sections, this Article considers both T J and international
human rights as potential tools for remediating some of the issues
discussed above.
III. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF DIGNITY
Humiliation in the law utterly contradicts the aims of TJ and
undermines the role of dignity. TJ is one of the most important legal
theoretical developments of the past two decades. 46 Having been
developed in cases involving mental disability, TJ presents a new model
for assessing the impact of case law and legislation by recognizing that, as
a therapeutic agent, the law that can have therapeutic or antitherapeutic
consequences. 47 The ultimate aim of TJ is to determine whether legal
44

Luther T. Munford, The Peacemaker Test: Designing Legal Rights to Reduce Legal Warfare,
12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 377, 387 (2007) (quoting, Larry H. Strasburger, The Litigant-Patient:
Mental Health Consequences of Civil Litigation. 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 203, 203
(1999)).
45
Munford, supra note 44, at 388.
46
See. e.g., MICHAEL PERLIN, 1-2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2D-3 at
534-41 (2d cd. 1999) (discussing therapeutic jurisprudence's role in law and mental health law
as well as its growth); David B. Wcxlcr, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, in
LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 157, 170
(David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick cds., 1996) (investigating therapeutic jurisprudence and its
role in the law); DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT 4 ( 1990) (discussing the importance of therapeutic jurisprudence and its
role in the law); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
MODEL 6-11 (2005) (discussing therapeutic jurisprudence's role in the law and mental health);
David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 32-33 (1992) (discussing the role of therapeutic jurisprudence in the
law and how Wexler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of
Mental Health in 1987); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24
TOURO L. REV. 17, 18 (2008) (discussing the growth of therapeutic jurisprudence).
47
Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill": How Will Jurors
Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 912
(2009); see also Kate Dicsfeld & ian Freckclton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, DISP. & DILEMMAS IN HEALTH L. 91, 97-106 (Ian Freckelton & Kerry Peterson

10
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rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance
their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process
principles. 48 There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler
has clearly identified how it must be resolved: the law's use of "mental
health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot impinge]
upon justice concems."49
TJ "asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people's lives"50 and
"focuses on the law's influence on emotional life and psychological wellbeing."51 It suggests that "law should value psychological health, should
strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible,
and when consistent with other values served by law should attempt to
bring about healing and wellness." 52
In recent years, scholars have considered a vast range of topics
through a TJ lens, including many aspects of mental disability law,
domestic relations law, criminal law, employment law, gay rights law, and
tort law. 53 As Ian Freckelton has noted, "[TJ] is a tool for gaining a new
cds., 2006) (discussing a transnational perspective).
48
See Ian Frcckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price
and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585-86 (2008) (discussing the importance
of balancing therapeutic jurisprudence with individual liberties); Michael L. Perlin, "Baby, Look
Inside Your Mirror": The Legal Profession's Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with
Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 591 (2008) (discussing how therapeutic

jurisprudence "[m]ight be a redemptive tool in effort to combat sanism, as a means of
'strip[ping] bare the law's sanist fa,.ade"); Michael L. Perlin, "You Have Discussed Lepers and
Crooks": Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 692, 719 (2003) (discussing the
role of therapeutic jurisprudence in clinical teaching to ensure due process); Bernard P.

Perlmutter. George's Story: Voice and Transformation through the Teaching and Practice of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
561, 599 n.lll (2005) (discussing how both client and lawyer must fully understand each
other's roles).
49

David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Changing Conceptions of Legal
in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE 597, 601 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996); see also David
Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, in APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179, 180-83
( 1996) (suggesting that Tarasoffs obligations for health professionals, if appropriately handled,
could promote therapeutic functioning while still protecting patients' privacy).

Scholarship,

50

Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing With Victims
ofCrime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
51
David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft Spots and
Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45
(Dennis P. Stolle et al., cds., 2000) (hereinafter PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE].
52

Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in INVOLUNTARY
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL
COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Dicsfcld & Ian Freckclton, cds., 2003).
53

Michael L. Perlin, "Things Have Changed": Looking at Non-institutional Mental Disability
Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 537 (2002--03).

2014]

FRIEND TO THE MARTYR

11

and distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological insights into the
law and its applications." 54 It is also part of a growing comprehensive
movement in the law towards establishing more humane and
psychologically optimal ways of handling legal issues collaboratively,
creatively, and respectfully. 55 In its aim to use the law to empower
individuals, enhance rights, and promote well-being, TJ has been
described as "a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law ... a
movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of
law ... which emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial
triumphalism." 56 That is, TJ supports the ethics of care. 57
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity. 58
Professor Carol Sanger suggests that dignity means that people "'possess
an intrinsic worth that should be recognized and respected,' and that they
should not be subjected to treatment by the state that is inconsistent with
their intrinsic worth." 59 The right to dignity is memorialized in many state

54

Ian Frcckclton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and
Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 576 (2008).
55
Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within the Comprehensive Law
Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 51, at 365.
56
Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. &
MED. 328, 329-30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to
Settlement: Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 341-42 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007) ("If
[judges, lawyers, police officers, expert witnesses testifying in court, and government officials at
every level] know that their actions either can impose psychological harm or facilitate emotional
wellbeing, they should strive to minimize the anti-therapeutic consequences of their conduct and
maximize its therapeutic potential."); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of

Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law
Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2006) (discussing how lawyers can lessen the burden
on their clients through ethical considerations).
57

See. e.g., Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A "Therapeutic"" Approach
to Enriching Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006)

("Therapeutic jurisprudence is a client-centered approach. This bedrock principle suggests that
the lawyer assist clients in making informed decisions by engaging the client and exploring all
possible alternatives."); Brookbanks, supra note 56, at 334 ("The emphasis of the ethics of care
is thus upon traits valued in intimate personal relationships including such things as sympathy,
compassion, fidelity, discernment, and love."); David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper: An

Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's Concerns About Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007) ("The addition of
a [therapeutic jurisprudence] lens ... will encourage criminal lawyers to practice explicitly and
systematically with an 'ethic of care' and 'psychological sensitivity."'); Winick & Wexler, supra
note 56, at 605-07 ("Lawyers applying a therapeutic jurisprudence approach thus explicitly
practice law with an ethic of care.").
58

59

Winick, supra note 52, at 161.

Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings. and the Misuse of
Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409,415 (2009) (quoting Gerald Neuman, Human Dignity in
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constitutions, human rights documents, judicial opinions, and constitutions
of other nations. 60 The legal process upholds human dignity by allowing
61
litigants, including criminal defendants, to tell their own stories. A
notion of individual dignity:
generally articulated through concepts of autonomy, respect, equality,
and freedom from undue government interference, was at the heart of a
jurisprudential and moral outlook that resulted in the reform, not only of
criminal procedure, but of the various institutions more or less directly
linked with the criminal justice system, including juvenile courts,
prisons, and mental institutions. 62
Fair process norms such as the right to counsel "operate as
substantive and procedural restraints on state power to ensure that the
individual suspect is treated with dignity and respect." 63 Dignity concepts
are expansive; a Canadian Supreme Court case has declared that
disenfranchisement of incarcerated persons violated their dignity
interests. 64
Professor Amy Ronner uses the "three Vs" (voice, validation, and
65
voluntariness) when explaining how dignity for litigants is attained. She
has stated:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense
of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant
feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken
seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation.

the United States Constitution, in ZUR AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS: LlBER AMICORUM
SPIROS SIMITIS 249, 249-50 n.2 I (Dieter Simon & Manfred Weiss cds., 2000)).
60
Perlin, The Role of Dignity, supra note 6, at 195.
61
See David Luban, Lecture, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy
Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 837 (2005) ("Human Dignity consists in having one's
own story to tell"); see also Katherine Kruse, The Human Dignity of Clients, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1343, 1353 (2008) (affirming Luban's "own story" aspect of human dignity).
62
Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism. 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1569 n.463 (2004).
63
Peter Arcnclla, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 200 (1983).
64
Perlin, Cast his Robe, supra note 6, at 21 (citing Sauve v. Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, para.
35 (Can.)); see also Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:
Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 464 (2010) (noting how the
Canadian Supreme Court struck down Canada's law permitting prisoner disenfranchisement).
65
Amy D. Ronncr, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartle by Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 60 I, 627 (2008); see also
Dicsfcld & Freckclton, supra note 47, at 99-106 (illustrating the importance of "voice" and
noting that a patient-centered hearing and communicative improvements could enhance a
detained persons' well-being).
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When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and
validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and
validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the
litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the
feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very
process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation
that affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved
behavior in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel
that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions. 66

Judicial and legislative policies should be changed to reflect the
aims of TJ so that, for example, the law can reduce the humiliation felt by
persons with mental disabilities and the elderly, or address whether sex
offender residency restrictions should be abolished. The authentic impacts
of these scarlet letter punishments are discussed below.
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 67
The state of the law as it relates to persons with disabilities must be
radically reconsidered in light of the ratification of the United Nations'
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 68 The CRPD is
"regarded as having finally empowered the 'world's largest minority' to
claim their rights, and to participate in international and national affairs on
an equal basis with others who have achieved specific treaty recognition
and protection."69 This convention is the most revolutionary international
66

Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94-95 (2002); see also AMY D.
RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 23 (2010) (reviewing the
"three Vs").
67

See Michael L. Perlin & Meredith Rose Schriver, "You That Hide Behind Walls": The
Relationship between the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the
Convention Against Torture and the Treatment of Institutionalized Forensic Patients, in

TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT IN HEALTH-CARE SETTINGS: A COMPILATION (Ctr. for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law, American Univ. Washington Coli. of Law cd., 2013) (discussing
the relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and international human rights law).
68

See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD (2011) (discussing the CRPD and its
implications).

69

Rosemary Kaycss & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. I, 4 (2008); see also Statements
Made on the Adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities by
Ambassador Don Mackay, Chair of the Ad-hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral
International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons
with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.un.org/disabilities/
default.asp?id=l55 (noting the statements made by multiple United Nations member states upon
adoption of the CRPD); Statements Made on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities at the U.N.

14

REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

[Vol. 24:1

human rights document ever created that applies to persons with
disabilities, 70 and "furthers the human rights approach to disability and
recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in most aspects
71
of life."
It firmly endorses a social model of disability and
reconceptualizes mental health rights as disability rights-a clear and
direct repudiation of the medical model that has traditionally directed
mental disability law. 72 "The Convention ... sketches the full range of
human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular
application to the lives of persons with disabilities. " 73 It provides a
framework for ensuring that mental health laws "fully recognize the rights
of those with mental illness."74 There is no question that it has "ushered in

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities by U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights Louise Arbour, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 5, 2006), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/
rights/ahc8hrcmsg.htm (noting that it is crucial to protect those with disabilities and that the
adoption of the CRPD by an ad hoc committee as a "momentous occasion").
70
See PERLIN, supra note 46, § 1-2, at 3-21 (discussing the importance and revolutionary nature
of the CRPD); Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szcli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution
and Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION, PRAXIS,
AND COURAGE 80, 85 (Michael Dudley ct al., cds., 2012) (labeling the CRPD as the "most
significant development in the recognition of the human rights of persons with mental
disabilities"); Michael L. Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come": The Implications of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of
Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 492-93 (2009) [hereinafter
Perlin, A Change Is Gonna Come] (noting how the CRPD allows those with disabilities to
participate equally in national and international affairs).
71
Perlin, A Change is Gonna Come, supra note 70, at 490.
72
See Phillip Fennel, Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental Disorder, 27 MED. & L. 95, 107
(2008) ("Traditional responses to mental ill-health have been based on social segregation and
separate treatment. ... Contemporary approaches [including the CRPD] draw on the
philosophies of social inclusion and non-stigmatization developed by the disability rights
movement."); Michael L. Perlin, "Abandoned Love": The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney On The
Intersection Between International Human Rights And Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 L. &
PSYCHOL. REV. ·121, 138-39 (2011) ("The 'wide scope' and 'holistic' CRPD furthers the human
rights approach to disability and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in
most aspects of life.").
73
Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights to
Participate in Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT'L L. J. 249, 256 (2009); see also Ronald
McCallum, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some
Reflection (Mar. 3, 201 0), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1563883 (noting
that the convention is broad in its scope, as it includes economic and cultural equality as
opposed to simply focusing on political equality).
74
Michael L. Perlin, "Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind": The Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1159, 1174 n.67 (2013) [hereinafter Perlin, Guardians] (quoting Bernadette
McSherry, International Trends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction, 26 LAW IN CONTEXT I, 8
(2008)).
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a new era of disability rights policy." 75
The convention describes disability as a condition ansmg from
"interaction with various barriers [that] may hinder [a person's] full and
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others," instead of
a person's inherent limitations/6 and extends existing human rights to take
into account the specific rights experiences of persons with disabilities. 77
The CRPD calls for "respect for inherent dignity" and "nondiscrimination."78 Subsequent articles within the CRPD declare "freedom
from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, ...
freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse," 79 and a right to protection
of the "integrity of the person."80
The CRPD is unique because it is the first legally binding
instrument devoted to the comprehensive protection of the rights of
persons with disabilities; it not only clarifies that States should not
discriminate against persons with disabilities, but also establishes the
many steps that States must take to create an enabling environment so that
persons with disabilities can enjoy authentic equality in society. 81

75

Paul Harpur, Time to Be Heard: How Advocates Can Use the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities to Drive Change, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1271, 1295 (2011).
76
CRPD, supra note 7, at 4.
77
Frederic Megrct, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or
Disability Rights?, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 494,515 (2008).
78
CRPD, supra note 7, at 5.
79
!d. at 12.
80
!d. at 13.
81
See Bryan Y. Lee, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its
Impact Upon Involuntary Civil Commitment of Individuals with Developmental Disabilities, 44
COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 393, 413-30 (2011) (discussing the changes that ratifying states
need to make in their domestic involuntary civil commitment laws to comply with CRPD
mandates); see also Kathryn D. DeMarco, Disabled by Solitude: The Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact on The Use of Supermax Solitary Confinement, 66 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 523, 544-50 (2011) (discussing the application of the CRPD to solitary
confinement in correctional institutions); Istvan Hoffman & Gyorgy Konczci, Legal Regulations

Relating to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual and Psychosocial
Disabilities in Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the
Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, 33 LOY. L.A.INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 16366 (2010) (discussing the application of the CRPD to capacity issues); Perlin, Gates of Eden,
supra note 6, at 193-97 (discussing the application of the CRPD to mental health court systems);
Perlin, Guardians, supra note 74, at 1176-83 (discussing the application of the CRPD to
guardianship law); Michael L. Perlin, "Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun": The
International Human Rights Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 301, 329-36 (2013) (discussing the application of the CRPD to juvenile punishment
schemes).
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V. HUMILIATING AND SHAMING SANCTIONS
The law shames and humiliates in many ways, sometimes
purposively and sometime inadvertently. In this section, this Article
explores in detail some of those shaming and humiliating modalities. In
each instance, questions must be raised: do these tactics and schemes
subordinate or privilege dignity? Are they consonant with therapeutic
jurisprudential principals? Do they potentially violate international human
rights law?

A.

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS DISCUSSING HUMILIATION AND SHAME

The Supreme Court has recognized that legislative enactments can
result in humiliating consequences, and has underscored dignity's
important role in the law. 82 In several landmark decisions, the Court has
struck down both criminal and civil statutes that humiliate and shame. 83
With these cases, the Court has acknowledged the importance of the role
of dignity.
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down a Texas statute that
criminalized certain intimate voluntary sexual conduct engaged in by two
persons of the same sex. 84 Specifically, the Court found:
The stigma this criminal statute imposes, more-over, is not trivial. The
offense, to be sure, is but a class C misdemeanor, a minor offense in the
Texas legal system. Still, it remains a criminal offense with all that
imports for the dignity of the persons charged. The petitioners will bear
on their record the history of their criminal convictions. Just this Term
we rejected various challenges to state laws requiring the registration of
sex offenders .... We are advised that if Texas convicted an adult for
private, consensual homosexual conduct under the statute here in

82

See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that one of the
critical functions of counsel in the trial process is to "protect the dignity and autonomy of a
person on trial"); see also, e.g., Philip Halpern, Government Intrusion into the Attorney-Client
Relationship: An Interest Analysis of Rights and Remedies, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 127, 172 (1983)
("The right to counsel embraces two separate interests: reliable and fair determinations in
criminal proceedings, and treatment of defendants with dignity and respect regardless of the
effect on the outcome of criminal proceedings.").
83
This is not to say that this line of decisions is unanimous. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012) (holding that suspicionlcss
strip searches of detainees being admitted to the general jail population did not violate the
Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments); Julian Simcock, Florence, Atwater, and the Erosion of
Fourth Amendment Protections for Arrestees, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 599, 602 (2013) (detailing how
decisions such as Florence may heighten the potential risk of abuse by prison officials).
84
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
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question the convicted person would come within the registration laws of
at least four States were he or she to be subject to their jurisdiction ....
This underscores the consequential nature of the punishment and the
state-sponsored condemnation attendant to the criminal prohibition.
Furthermore, the Texas criminal conviction carries with it the other
collateral consequences always following a conviction, such as notations
on job application forms, to mention but one example. 85
Elsewhere, the Court has specifically recognized the shame that can
result when dignity is not present. In Indiana v. Edwards, the Court held
that "a right of self-representation at trial will not 'affirm the dignity' of a
defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without
86
the assistance of counsel." The Court stated that "to the contrary, given
that defendant's uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result
from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating
. ,87
as enno bl mg.

85

!d. at 575-76 (citing to state laws in Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina). See
infra text accompanying notes 294-97 (considering the discussion of shame and humiliation in
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA") case of Smith v. Doc, 538 U.S.
84, 86 (2002)). Remarkably, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals chose to ignore those aspects
of Lawrence that deal with shame and dignity in its decision upholding an Alabama statute
banning the sale of sexual devices of the sort typically used by women. Williams v. Att'y Gen.
of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (lith Cir. 2004). In its opinion, the court declined to "extrapolate
from Lawrence and its dicta a right to sexual privacy triggering strict scrutiny" and rejected the
dissent's argument that public morality is no longer a rational basis for legislation. Id at 1238.
In writing about this case, Professors Waldman and Herald have pointed out that the Court was
aware of the disproportionate harm to women, since the court's rationale assumed that the sale
of sex products used by males would go undisturbed. Ellen Waldman & Mary beth Herald, Eyes
Wide Shut: Erasing Women's Experiences from the Clinic to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 285, 305 (2005). The professors have also emphasized that the law stigmatizes private
sexual conduct. !d. "The court's main point seems to be that this would all be easier if women
would keep quiet and be happy with the few 'body massagers' that they arc able to procure." !d.
Sec Alana Chazan, Good Vibrations: Liberating Sexuality from the Commercial Regulation of
Sexual Devices, 18 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 263, 295 (2009), for a discussion on how the sexual
device cases "effectively criminalize or pathologizcs all women who usc sexual devices."
86
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (citing McKasklc v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168,
176-77 (1984) (finding a pro sc defendant's Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense
was not violated by unsolicited participation of standby counsel)). Edwards modified the
holding of Godinez v. Moran, that had mandated a unitary competency standard in all aspects of
the criminal trial process, including trial, guilty pleas and counsel waivers. Godinez v. Moran,
509 U.S. 389 (1993). See also, PERLIN, supra note 46, § 88-3.1c(l), at 44-51 (2d cd. 1999)
("Although the Court took pains to assert that Godinez v. Moran 'docs not answer' the question
posed in Edwards (although it 'bears certain similarities' to it), at the least, Edwards carves out
an important exception to that decision.").
87
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176. See PERLIN, supra note 46, at 48 (discussing how the Supreme
Court's focus on dignity and the perceptions of justice arc, perhaps, its first implicit
endorsement of important principles of therapeutic jurisprudence in a criminal procedure
context). See supra text accompanying notes 46-66 (discussing of therapeutic jurisprudence in
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The Court has also recognized that age can play a role in the
humiliation experienced. Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding
involved a strip search of a thirteen-year-old female by her school's
Assistant Principal. 88 The Court found that the student's expectation of
privacy is "inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and
humiliating" and that the reasonableness of her expectation of privacy is
indicated by "consistent experiences of other young people similarly
searched, whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent
intrusiveness of the exposure. " 89
Most recently, in United States v. Windsor, 90 in striking down
portions of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), the court recognized
the humiliating consequences resulting from DOMA and the importance
of the role of dignity, 91 stating:
DOMA's principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned
marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose
inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency.
Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of
the person. And DOMA contrives to deprive some couples married
under the laws of their State, but not other couples, of both rights and
responsibilities. By creating two contradictory marriage regimes within
the same State, DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as married for
the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law,
thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal
relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect. By
this dynamic DOMA undermines both the public and private
significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells those
couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are
unworthy of federal recognition. This places same-sex couples in an
unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage. The differentiation
demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution
protects ... and whose relationship the State has sought to dignify. And
it humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex
couples. The law in question makes it even more difficult for the

general).
Safford Unified Seh. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 366 (2009).
89
/d. at 366, 375; see also Steven F. Shatz, Molly Donovan & Jeanne Hong, The Strip Search of
Children and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. I, II (1991) (discussing how evidence
from psychologists supports the assumption that any search of a school age child or adolescent
has a greater impact because the development of a sense of privacy is critical to a child's
maturation).
90
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (20 13).
91
/d. at 2694.
88
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children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family
and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily
lives. 92
B. SHAME AND HUMILIATION IN SPECIFIC LEGAL CONTEXTS

1. "Scarlet Letter" Punishments
Shaming penalties, also known as scarlet letter punishments, have
recently arisen in the criminal justice system93 as an alternative sanction
that allegedly is economically sound while satisfying "the community's
desire to punish and condemn crime."94 Scarlet letter punishments are
sanctions that "shine a spotlight on offenders in order to warn others of
antisocial activity and of the miscreants perpetrating the deeds."95 The
concept of "shaming punishments" has "leaped from the nineteenth
century fiction of Nathaniel Hawthome 96 into the twentieth century
courtroom."97 Public humiliation is predicated on the belief that it will
deter individuals from committing antisocial acts. 98 Some judges who use
92
/d.; see also Colin Starger, A Visual Guide to United States v. Windsor: Doctrinal Origins of
Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 130 (2013) (describing the
relationship between the opinions in Windsor and Lawrence).
93
These punishments may be the product of either legislation or judicial decision.
94
Massaro, supra note 5, at 688. This Article's position needs to be explicit. This sort of
"shaming sanction" is completely unmoored from and totally unrelated to the sort of shaming
sanctions discussed by John Braithwaite in his writings about "reintegrative shaming theory," in
which he writes about the consequences of shaming after an offense is committed. JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 55 (1989); Cesar J. Rcbcllon et al.,
Anticipated Shaming and Criminal Offending, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 988, 989 (2010).
95
Brian Netter, Avoiding the Shameful Backlash: Social Repercussions for the Increased Use of
Alternative Sanctions, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 188 (2005).
96
NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850). See generally Sandi Varnado,
Avatars, Scarlet "A"s, and Adultery in the Technological Age, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2013)
(discussing contemporaneous considerations of adultery in a scarlet letter context).
97
Scott Sanders, Scarlet Letters, Bilboes and Cable TV: Are Shame Punishments Cruel and
Outdated or Are They a Viable Option for American Jurisprudence?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 359,
359 (1998) (quoting Julia C. Martinez, Judges Using 'Shame Punishment' More to Emphasize
Message, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Feb. 16, 1997, at n.l); see also ELIZABETH STROUT, THE
BURGESS BOYS 35-36 (2013) ("Bob's mind went to his grandmother, who used to tell stories of
their English ancestors arriving ten generations earlier. ... One day, his grandmother told him
how thieves would be made to walk through the town. She said if a man stole a fish he had to
walk around town holding the fish, calling out, 'I stole the fish and I am sorry!' While the town
crier followed, beating a drum."); Luke Coyne, Can Shame Be Therapeutic?, 7 ARIZ. SUMMIT L.
REV. 539, 541-543 (2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2214413 (demonstrating the use of shaming punishments in the American criminal justice
system throughout the sixteenth to early nineteenth century).
98
See, e.g., Dale Lezon, Judge Uses Signs to Change Behavior, Hous. CHRONICLE (June 3,
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shaming sanctions in the sentencing of criminals state explicitly that these
sanctions work to deter future criminal behavior because they involve
public humiliation, 99 an approach that apparently meets with the support
and approval of both a significant portion of the public 100 as well as some
scholars. 101
The range of humiliation sanctions is robust:
(1) A warning sign placed on the front door of a child molester's home

following his release from jail, reading "No children under the age of
[eighteen] allowed on these premises by court order." 102
(2) A witness who committed perjury in court being ordered to wear a
sign in front of the courthouse which read: "I lied in court. Tell the truth
or walk with me." 103
(3) A convicted thief being ordered to place an ad at least four inches in
height and bearing the felon's photograph in the newspaper following his
release from prison reading: "I am a convicted thief." 104
(4) Convicted drunk drivers being ordered "to wear pink hats during
their performance ·of community service projects or to affix bumper
stickers to their vehicles warning others of their crime." 105
(5) Prison inmates who expose themselves in the presence of female
guards being forced to wear pink uniforms. 106
(6) A burglary victim being allowed to take something of like value out

2002), available at http://www.chron.com/news/houston-tcxas/articlc/Judgc-uscs-signs-tochange-bchavior-2069028.php (noting how Judge Poe commented that humiliation can "change
behavior").
99
See Sanders, supra note 97; Barbara Clare Morton, Bringing Skeletons out of the Closet and
into the Light-"Scarlet Leiter" Sentencing Can Meet the Goals of Probation in Modern
America Because it Deprives Offenders of Privacy, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 120-21 (2001)
("Public apologies, sign wearing, bumper stickers, or fluorescent bracelets also can serve to
rehabilitate and deter offenders.").
100
Robert Misner, A Strategy for Mercy, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1335 (2000).
101
AaronS. Book, Shame on You, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 680-81 (1999); see, e.g., Dan
M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 635 (1996) (arguing
that shaming sanctions reinforce public norms against criminality).
102

1o3

104

Sanders, supra note 97, at 359-70.
Id

Id (citing Fort Pierce Judge Tries Humiliating Defendants, FLA. TODAY, Dec. 6, 1996, at

58).
105

Id (citing Fort Pierce Judge Tries Humiliating Defendants, FLA. TODAY, Dec. 6, 1996, at

58).
106
!d. (citing Courtney G. Persons, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency,
Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1535 (1996)).
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of the burglar's home. 107
(7) A convicted purse snatcher being forced to wear tap shoes while out
in public. 108
Other examples include forcing shoplifters to parade in front of the
stores they have victimized, carrying signs that announce their offenses or
forcing DUI offenders to affix bumper stickers to their cars that read "I am
a convicted drunk driver." 109 There are many, many more similar
examples, including a trial judge in one sex offender case who said, about
persons who molest children, "It is my feeling that we should probably
dye them green." 110
Some scholars argue that the reemergence of shaming penalties is
due to society's growing belief that prison terms, fines, and parole are not
rehabilitating criminals. 111 But in almost every instance, the humiliating
measures are punitive in design and scope. 112
Judicially-imposed shaming penalties fall into four categories:
"stigmatizing publicity, literal stigmatization, self-debasement, and
demands for public expressions of contrition." 113 Stigmatizing publicity
sanctions are those that publicize criminal status, like publishing names of
convicted sex offenders on the web or in a newspaper. 114 Literal
stigmatization involves sanctions that effectively attach a label on the
offender, like wearing a sign or affixing a bumper sticker to a car, 115 while
"[s]elf-debasement penalties involve ceremonies or rituals that publicly
disgrace the offender." 116 Public expression-of-contrition penalties force
offenders to apologize for their offenses. 117
107

Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 736
(1998).
108
Sanders, supra note 97, at 359-70 (citing Kirsten R. Brcdlic, Keeping Children Out of
Double Jeopardy: An Assessment of Punishment and Megan's Law in Doc v. Poritz, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 501, 512 n.77 (1996)).
109
Massaro, supra note 5, at 689.
110
Leonore Tavill, Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty Is Today 's
Probation Condition, 36 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 613,644 n. 193 (1988).
111
Morton, supra note 99, at 98.
112
See Misner, supra note 100, at 1364-65 (noting how humiliating sentences arc "additional
punishment").
113

Kahan, supra note I 0 I, at 631.
/d. at 631-32.
116
Jd. at 632.
116
Jd. at 633.
117
Jd. at 634; see also W. Reed Leverton, The Case for Best Practice Standards in Restorative
Justice Processes, 31 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc. 501, 506 (2008) (discussing how apologies can be
"benign, yet humiliating"); supra text accompanying note 41.
114
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Many cases involving shaming sanctions are never appealed. 118
Those that are appealed often result in appellate courts upholding the use
of such scarlet letter punishments. In Ballenger v. State, for instance, the
Georgia Court of Appeals, upheld a shaming condition requiring the
offender to wear a fluorescent pink plastic bracelet imprinted with the
words "D.U.I. CONVICT." 119 The court rejected the offender's arguments
that wearing the bracelet violated his equal protection rights and
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 120 The court stated that "being
jurists rather than psychologists, we cannot say that the stigmatizing effect
of wearing the bracelet may not have a rehabilitative, deterrent effect on
Ballenger." 121
Likewise, in State v. Bateman, the Court of Appeals of Oregon
upheld a probation requirement that required the offender to post signs
reading "dangerous sex offender" on his residence and on any vehicle that
he was operating. 122 In Goldschmitt v. State, the District Court of Appeal
of Florida upheld a probation requirement that a driver affix a bumper
sticker to his automobile reading "CONVICTED D.U.I.- RESTRICTED
LICENSE." 123 The court held that the shaming condition did not violate
the First Amendment or Eighth Amendment. 124 Specifically, that court
stated that they were "unable to state as a matter of law that Goldschmitt's
bumper sticker is sufficiently humiliating to trigger constitutional
objections." 125
United States v. Gementera is perhaps the most important appellate
decision regarding scarlet letter punishrnents. 126 The Ninth Circuit Court of

118
It should be noted that such punishments have been rejected by some courts. See Coyne,
supra note, at 97 (discussing decisions in State v. Schad, 206 P.3d 22 (Kan. App. 2009}, State v.
Muhammad, 43 P.3d 318 (Mont. 2002), and People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. 1997), all
ruling that the usc of shaming signs violated sentencing statutes for not meeting the goals of
rehabilitation and protection of the public).
119
Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793, 794-95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
120 !d.
121 /d.
122

State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 316 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 124-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
124
!d. at 126.
125
!d. (noting that the court's only concern was the potential humiliation suffered by someone
other than the defendant, insofar as the defendant's vehicle might be owned or operated by
others).
123

126

United States v. Gcmcntcra, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004); see Preston H. Nccl, Comment,
Punishment or Not: The Effect of United States v. Gementera's Shame Condition on the Everchanging Concept of Supervised Release Conditions, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 153 (2007)
(summarizing Gementera).
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Appeals upheld a supervised release condition that required a convicted
mail thief to spend a day wearing a signboard that stated "I stole mail.
This is my punishment." 127 The court held this punishment was reasonably
related to the legitimate statutory objective of rehabilitation. 128 Moreover,
it rejected that the shaming sanction violated the Eighth Amendment. 129
Arguing for form over substance, the Ninth Circuit loosely connected
supervised release conditions that shamed with the inherent qualities
found in all criminal punishments, stating they "nearly always cause
shame and embarrassment." 130 It emphasized that:
[A]ny condition must be 'reasonably related' to 'the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant.' Moreover, it must be both 'reasonably related' to and
'involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary' to
'afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,' protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant,' and 'provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner.' ... The 'reasonable relation'
test is necessarily a 'very flexible standard,' and that such flexibility is
necessary because of 'our uncertainty about how rehabilitation is
accomplished, [as reflected in the] vigorous, multifaceted, scholarly
debate on shaming sanctions' efficacy, desirability, and underlying
rationales [as it] continues within the academy. 131

Some legal scholars argue that scarlet letter punishments generally
help establish and reinforce social norms because they "effectively and
cheaply communicate opprobrium for criminal behavior and thereby
increase the social, emotional, and other costs of [the behavior they
condemn]." 132 Yet these arguments fail to take into account that the
alleged deterrent effects of shaming sanctions are doubtful in modem
settings, especially in urban areas, 133 and in situations where the potential

127

Gementera, 379 F.3d at 598.
!d. at 607.
129
!d. at 610.
130
!d. at 605. It should be noted that the court did not address the defendant's First, Fifth, or
Fourteenth Amendment claims.
131
!d. at 600, 603, 605.
132
Massaro, supra note 5, at 689.
133
Gementera, 379 F.3d at 694. There has also been scant consideration in the case law of how
different the nation was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when sanctioning humiliation
was greatly effective, compared to today, where there arc dramatically different cultural
conditions, such as larger cities, a much greater likelihood of anonymity, and greater value
placed on privacy rights); see, e.g., Morton, supra note 99, at 109 (citing Toni Massaro, Shame,
Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1922 (1991) (noting how shaming
128
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offenders are not "members of an identifiable group, such as a close-knit
religious or ethnic community." 134 The alleged deterrence effects
justification is further weakened because the government is unable to
assess public reaction to these punishments. 135
An increase in the use of shaming sanctions could decrease any
deterrent effect from their use as social norms adapt to this punishment
and accept them as typical. 136 For example, "if there is a convict with a
sandwich board on every street corner, then the potential criminal would
conclude that the stigma was less burdensome." 137 Moreover, in a society
that values privacy and independence, rather than community and
dependence, the effectiveness of shaming is reduced. 138 In fact, there is
very little empirical evidence showing that shaming sanctions improve
society. 139 Importantly, there have been no comprehensive studies to their
effectiveness, 140 and there is no empirical work available through which
the practical impact of such sanctions can be tested. 141 Professor Kahan,
the leading academic supporter of such judicial interventions, believes it is
"too early to determine the success of shame punishments." 142 Professor
Stephen Garvey concluded, "No one knows for certain [about the
effectiveness of judicial intervention]." 143
The lack of valid and reliable research (or even systemic empirical
inquiry) must be considered in light of the judicial narcissism reflected in
the statements of some of the judges who are the strongest proponents of
shaming sanctions. An Ohio judge has stated (on the "Dr. Phil" television

sanctions have failed in modern times)); Morton, supra note 99, at I 09 ("[S]carlct letter
sentences successfully control and deter criminal conduct only under very limited, and currently
nonexistent, societal conditions.").
134
Massaro, supra note 133, at 1883.
135
Paul Zicl, Eighteenth Century Public Humiliation Penalties in Twenty-First Century
America: The "Shameful" Return of "Scarlet Letter" Punishments in U.S. v. Gcmcntcra, 19
BYU J. PUB. L. 499, 508 (2005).
136
Netter, supra note 95, at 190; Morton, supra note 99, at 121-22.
137
Netter, supra note 95, at 198-99.
138
Morton, supra note 99, at 121.
139
Netter, supra note 95, at 215.
140
Sanders, supra note 197, at 378.
141
Massaro, supra note 133, at 1918.
142
Sanders, supra note 97, at 359-60 (quoting June Arney, Shame and Punishment: Our
Forebears Put Scoundrels in Stocks, or Branded Them With the "Scarlet Letter." Now, 300
Years Later, "Shame" Sentences Are Back in Vogue, VIRGINIAN-PILOT LEDGER-STAR, Mar. 2,
1997, at Jl); Kahan, supra note 101, at 638 (arguing that shaming sanctions reinforce public
norms against criminality).
143
Garvey, supra note 107, at 753.
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show), "I've been a judge for almost 14 years, and the most effective
punishments are those that fit the crime. They teach the offenders a lesson
they'll never forget. My court is a people's court." 144 A Texas judgenamed Poe-labels these sanctions as "Poe-etic punishments" (in some
cases, ordering the use of sandwich boards advertising the offender's
crime), explaining that "[O]ur founders knew that the judgment of a
friend, a neighbor, or family member held far greater significance than
that of the jailer or judge." 145 Such proponents of shaming are "sure" that
their sanctions reduce recidivism based on their "ordinary common
sense" 146 and limited personal knowledge, but infrequently rely on valid
statistical literature to support their position. 147
Shaming sanctions may be psychologically debilitating, as one
commenter who is a director of a mental health program for juveniles, has
argued in criticizing this approach: 148
All of our mental health programs end up having more and more people
come in with trauma at the hands of humiliation. When you do this
creative type of justice, the problem is that it's just going to make the
behavior show up in different ways. So, [the judge] may never see that
person again, but mental health programs will see that person, other
judges may see that person or, unfortunately, the morgue may see that
149
person.

144
Coyne, supra note 97, at 552 (quoting Dr. Phil Show: Wrongful Punishment (CBS television
broadcast Aug. 10, 2007)).
145
!d. at 546 (quoting Sanders, supra note 98, at 366-67).
146
See Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism Through
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22 TEMP. POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. I, 38 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (discussing how inappropriate factors
cloud judicial decision making in sex offender cases).
147
See Coyne, supra note 97, at 561 "The judges issuing shaming sanctions produce most
evidence of its effectiveness. ln Sarasota County, Florida, Judge Titus initiated a DUI bumper
sticker penalty in 1985. He claims that since the program began DU I arrests dropped one-third in
the county. Judge Titus believes fear of public knowledge of the offense led to the reduction.
Judge Cicconctti has said only two offenders who received his shaming sanctions have
rcoffended. Another famous issuer of shaming sanctions, Judge Poe, stated, "I have no slats, but
people I've imposed this type of sentence on haven't been back through the system." While the
anecdotal evidence is promising, independent studies arc needed to assess the effectiveness of
shaming sanctions." /d.
148 !d.
149
!d. at 557 (internal citations omitted). The judge in question-Michael Cicconetti-hands
down sentences that he has characterized as "provocative enough so it gets everybody's attention
and deters other people from doing the same thing." Tracey Read, Most Influential: Judge
Cicconetti 's Alternative Sentences Leave Impression (With Video), THE NEWS-HERALD (Dec.
31, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.ncws-hcrald.com/gcncral-ncws/2012123 1/most-influcntialjudgc-michacl-cicconcttis-altcrnativc-scntcnccs-lcavc-imprcssion-with-vidco.
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In addition, proponents of shaming sanctions fail to recognize that
shaming sanctions can be more harmful than prison because it conveys the
message that offenders subject to shaming sanctions are less than human,
and deserve our individual and collective contempt. 150 "Sending this kind
of message, even about criminal offenders, is, and should be, jarring in a
political order that makes equality a cultural baseline." 151 It is hard to
imagine how shaming penalties that are crude and degrading will foster
respect for the law. 152 It is more likely that they are frequently
counterproductive; philosopher Jeremy Waldron has noted that the
predictable response to humiliation is for its target to "lash out at the
humiliator" via a combination of anger and fear. 153
Humiliation is also contradictory to the aims of TJ and restorative
justice, 154 as it robs the process of dignity, and ultimately demeans the
victims of the initial criminal activity. 155 A commentator has characterized
them as "particularly poor tools of rehabilitation and specific
deterrence." 156 James Whitman has argued that the chief evil of public
humiliation sanctions is not their effect on an offender but their effect on a
society of onlookers whose punitive sensibilities will be inflamed by
publicly sanctioned shaming. 157 Finally, a law and economics analysis of
such sanctions concludes that shaming penalties are self-destructive. 158

150

Massaro, supra note 5, at 699.
!d. at 700.
152
Zicl, supra note 135, at 510.
153
Jeremy Waldron, On Humiliation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1787, 1801 (1995).
154
See, e.g., Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice and Sexual Assault: An Archival Study of Court
and Conference Cases, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 334, 335-36 (2006) (providing a brief
description of restorative justice); PERLIN, supra note 6, at 79; Bruce J. Winick & David B.
Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming
the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 607-11 (2006) (describing therapeutic
151

jurisprudence).
155

C.f Perlin, Dignity Was the First to Leave, supra note 6 (arguing that allowing seriously
mentally disabled defendants to represent themselves in criminal trials is demeaning to the
victims of the underlying crimes); see also Massaro, supra note 133, at 1943 (discussing how
state-enforced shaming "authorizes public officials to search for and destroy or damage an
offender's dignity").
156

Persons, supra note I 06, at 154 7.

157

James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, I 07 YALE L.J. I 055,

1068-75 (1998).
158
Alon Harcl & Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May
Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 374 (2007); see also Alon Harcl, Why
Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Case against Privately Inflicted Sanctions,
14 LEGAL THEORY 113, 132 (2008) ("In [shaming] cases the suffering inflicted on the criminal

is merely a price reflecting the inferior quality of the goods or services rather than a genuinely
punitive measure."); Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on
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There has been recent academic interest in this topic from a wide
range of perspectives. Barbara Morton 159 examined the issue through the
prism of heightened expectations of privacy, and found that this
expectation served as a "powerful deterrent and rehabilitative mechanism
attendant in [the use of such sanctions]." 160 Robert Misner, on the other
hand, made a plea for the incorporation of mercy into any sentencing
system. 161 Stephanos Bibas and Richard Bierschbach called on us to
consider (and expand) the role of apology and remorse in the criminal
justice system. 162 Sharon Lamb looked at the need to consider parenting
techniques and moral development in aiding the law, "as a collective
expression of cultural values," to employ "moral standards to balance its
condemnatory function." 163
The use of shaming sanctions frequently lessens the likelihood that
the offender will be reintegrated into society because these sanctions may
lead to ostracism, leading to offenders suffering degradation indefinitely
and losing social status. Such sanctions would put them in peril of losing
employment. 164 Further, the victim is forced to relive the offense and
confront the offender, even though there is no evidence that there is a
rehabilitative effect for offenders who come face-to-face with their
victims. 165 Scarlet letter punishments may also lead them to commit more
crimes if they are permanently marked and unable to rejoin society. 166
These punishments also affect third parties, such as children or spouses of
. hment. 167
. .
the rectptent
o f the pums

Megan's Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 371 (2005) (discussing how there is limited
empirical data evaluating this issue).
159

Ultimately, this Article disagrees with Morton's final position.

160

Morton, supra note 99, at 100.

161

Misner, supra note 100, at 1308-13.

162

Stcphanos Bibas & Richard Bicrschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 112-19 (2004).
163
Sharon Lamb, The Psychology of Condemnation: Underlying Emotions and Their Symbolic
Expression in Condemning and Shaming, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 929, 931 (2003).
164
Massaro, supra note 5, at 695.
165
Compare Massaro, supra note 133, at 1895 (discussing how shaming sanctions arc beneficial
to the victim), with Coyne, supra note 97, at 25-26 (arguing that there is no empirical evidence
supporting that shaming sanctions arc beneficial to the victims of the offense). See also Raffaele
Rodogno, Shame and Guilt in Restorative Justice, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 142, 146
(2008) (discussing how the shame-rage spiral within the restorative justice context is created
when the victim feels shame and anger in response to the offense against him and the offender
reacts defensively rather than acknowledging the victim's hurt feelings).
166
167

Coyne, supra note 97, at 561.

Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 126 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("[W]e were
innocent
persons
might
be
punished
by
the
bumper
concerned ... that
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This research affirms that scarlet letter punishments are harmful and
punitive in nature, outweighing any potential benefit. In light of these
arguments, such humiliating practices must end.

C.

HOW COERCIVE POLICE AUTHORITY SHAMES BY INTRUDING ON
DIGNITY

In her recent magisterial opinion, holding the New York City Police
168
Department's stop-and-frisk policies unconstitutional,
Judge Shira
Scheindlin focused on the issue of humiliation:
The Supreme Court has recognized that 'the degree of community
resentment aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an
assessment of the quality of the intrusion upon reasonable expectations
of personal security.' In light of the very active and public debate on the
issues addressed in this Opinion-and the passionate positions taken by
both sides-it is important to recognize the human toll of
unconstitutional stops. While it is true that any one stop is a limited
intrusion in duration and deprivation of liberty, each stop is also a
demeaning and humiliating experience. No one should live in fear of
being stopped whenever he leaves his home to go about the activities of
daily life. Those who are routinely subjected to stops are
overwhelmingly people of color, and they are justifiably troubled to be
singled out when many of them have done nothing to attract the
unwanted attention. Some plaintiffs testified that stops make them feel
unwelcome in some parts of the City, and distrustful of the police. This
alienation cannot be good for the police, the community, or its leaders.
Fostering trust and confidence between the police and the community
would be an improvement for everyone. 169
Importantly, Judge Scheindlin approvingly cited a Ninth Circuit
decision focusing on how such stops "are humiliating, damaging to the
detainees' self-esteem, and reinforce the reality that racism and intolerance
170
are for many African-Americans a regular part of their daily lives."

sticker ... however ... the 'CONVICTED-D.U.I.' message [becomes] obscured when persons
other than the probationer arc using the vehicle .... ").
168
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal dismissed
(Sept. 25, 20 13). The Floyd decision has since been stayed, sec Ligon v. City of New York, 538
F. App'x 101 (2d Cir. 2013), but subsequent to the stay, the City's motion to vacate was denied.
Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 231 (2nd Cir. 2013). See generally, Katherine A.
Macfarlane, The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the Southern District of New
York's "Related Cases" Rule Shaped Stop-and-Frisk Rulings, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 199 (2014)
(discussing the development of stop-and-frisk jurisprudence).
169
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (internal citations omitted).
170
/d. at 602--03 (emphasis added) (citing Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir.
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Professor Jeffrey Fagan has recently spoken about about the
indignities of "order maintenance policing," and how this sort of policing
intrudes on the dignity of citizens by "proactive interdict[ion] and
temporar[y] detain[ ing of] citizens whose behavior is deemed sufficiently
suspicious for police to conclude that 'crime is afoot. "' 171 In this speech,
Fagan discussed the indignity of the unreasonable searches, and explained
how such searches "accord with the common understanding of
humiliation, in particular humiliations that involve intrusions on highly
private spheres: intrusion in bodily functions, such as urine tests; searches
of the person, especially strip searches; and searches of personal
belongings that are perceived as private, such as purse or carry-on
luggage." 172 He calls for a "jurisprudence of respect," 173 arguing that "the
systematic and cumulative denial of recognition-respect from the statehas stigmatizing effects that can lead to a deprivation on top of a breach
with the moral bases of the law." 174 Perhaps decisions like that of Judge
Scheindlin in Floyd will lead to a new reconceptualization of the impacts
of current policies.
D.

TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND ELDERS

In light of the recently ratified CRPD, 175 it follows that persons with
mental disabilities should be afforded greater protection from being
humiliated and shamed. This section will address the importance of the
CRPD in this context, then explore five areas that highlight the passive
and overt use of humiliation and shame subjected to persons with mental
disabilities and the elderly: the institutionalization of persons with mental
illness, involuntary outpatient treatment, gun control, treatment of

1996)); see also Elizabeth A. Gayncs, The Urban Criminal Justice System: Where Young +
Black+ Male= Probable Cause, 20 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 621, 623-25 (1993) (discussing the
discrimination African-Americans encounter); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable
Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 679-80 (1994)
("Put in the simplest terms, the criminal justice system treats African-Americans and Hispanic
Americans differently than it docs whites."); Tracey Maclin, Black and Blue Encounters-Some
Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L.
REV. 243, 250-57 (1991) ("[African-American] men know they are liable to be stopped at
anytime, and that when they question the authority of the police, the response from the cops is
often swift and violent.").
171
Jeffrey Fagan, Indignities of Order Maintenance Policing, at 3, available at
http://www.law.arizona.edu/Events/Soll_Lcctures/Soll_lccture_2013.efm.
172
Jd. at 7.
173 Jd. at 21.
174
175

Jd. at 23.
See supra text accompanying notes 67-81.
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institutionalized elderly persons, and guardianships. Although these areas
appear to be varied in scope, they share underlying issues involving the
overt and passive uses of shame.
E.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The rights of persons with mental disabilities have been
systematically violated in virtually all societies. 176 Persons with disabilities
face degradation, stigmatization, and discrimination. 177 Disproportionally,
persons with mental disabilities are involuntarily committed to
institutions, and deprived of their freedom, dignity, and basic human
rights. 178 Persons with mental disabilities are relegated to psychiatric
institutions that often isolate such persons and subject them to deplorable
conditions that threaten their health and, in some cases, their lives. 179
In the United States, persons with mental disabilities are still
frequently housed in institutions that shock the conscience and humiliate
the persons incarcerated there. 18 Court decisions and statutes have
legalized forced isolation of persons with mental illness through personal
protections orders, denial of evaluations, inpatient treatment, assisted
outpatient treatment, and inadequate treatment in jails and prisons. 181
Isolation leads to feelings of shame for persons living with mental
disabilities. 182 Thus, poor treatment might discourage treatment and

°

176

Aaron Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of Mental Disability: The
Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of
Persons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 181,203 (2005);
177
Perlin & Szeli, supra note 70, at 87.
178
See PERLIN, supra note 46, § 2A-3, at 14 (discussing the problematic nature of involuntary
commitments of individuals with mental disabilities).
179

Lance Gable ct al., Mental Health and Due Process in the Americas: Protecting Human
Rights of Persons Involuntarily Admitted and Detained in Psychiatric Institutions, 18 PAN AM.
J. PUBLIC HEALTH 365, 366 (2005).
180
See PERLIN supra note 46, Ch. 3A, at 3-154.
181
Hon. David A. Hoort, Mentallllness and the Courts, 91 MICH. B. J. 28, 31 (2012); see also
MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HENRY A. DLUGACZ, MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN JAILS AND PRISONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2008) (discussing issues in jails and prisons).
182

Stigmatic isolation occurs when an individual's desire to manage shame leads him to follow
strategies such as withdrawal and secrecy. See. e.g., W. David Bell, The Civil Case at the Heart
of Criminal Procedure: In Rc Winship, Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 117, 146 (2011) (citing Terri A. Winnick & Mark Bodkin, Anticipated Stigma and
Stigma Management Among Those to be Labeled "Ex-Con," 29 DEVIANT BEHAV. 295, 299-300
(2008)) (discussing how stigmatization can lead to isolation); see also Sherry Young, Getting to
Yes: The Case against Banning Consensual Relationships in Higher Education, 4 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 269, 286 (1996) (discussing the relationship between shame and psychiatric
hospitalization).
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encourage persons living with mental illness to keep their illness a
secret. 183
Olmstead v. L. C. ex rei. Zimring sought to enforce the right to
community integration for persons with mental disabilities. 184 The
Supreme Court held that the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
requires States to provide community-based treatment, and that unjustified
isolation is discrimination based on disability, 185 noting that the ADA
"specifically identifies unjustified 'segregation' of persons with
disabilities as a 'for[m] of discrimination."' 186 The CRPD also guarantees
the right for persons with disabilities to live in the community .187
Nevertheless, approximately 40,000 Americans continue to reside in
. . hosptta
. ls. 188
psyc h tatnc

183

See Maria Squcra, The Competing Doctrines of Privacy and Free Speech Take Center Stage
after Princess Diana's Death, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 205,219-20 (1998) (citing Martin
London, Greater Legal Restrictions on the Paparazzi? Yes, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at 2)
(noting how patients may want to keep their admission to hospitals a secret).
184
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rei. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 581 ( 1999).
185
/d. at 597.
186
/d. at 583 (citing Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210l(a)(2), 1210l(a)(5)
(2012) [hereinafter ADA].
187
CRPD, supra note 7, at 15. President Obama signed the CRPD three years ago. See Michelle
Diamcnt, Obama Urges Senate to Ratify Disability Treaty (May 18, 20 12), available at
http://www.disabilityscoop.Com/20 12/05/ 18/0bama-Urges-Scnatc-Trcaty/15654/. However, the
Senate failed to ratify on December 4, 2012 because of a lack of a "super majority" of votes.
Senate Fails to Ratify the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), THE
AM. ASS'N OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.aapd.com/rcsources/
prcss-room/aapd-praiscs-selcction-of-l-l-1-l-l-l-l.html. Another hearing may take place before
the end of calendar year 2014. The Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD)
U.S. INT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITIES, http://www.disabilitytreaty.org/crpd. Although the
United States has not ratified the CRPD, "a state's obligations under it are controlled by the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties[,] which requires signatories 'to refrain from acts
which would defeat [the Disability Convention's] object and purpose."' Henry A. Dlugacz &
Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with Limited Competency in
Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 331, 362-63 (2011)
(discussing In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2010) (finding that
guardianship appointments must be subject to requirements of periodic reporting and review)).
See Perlin, Guardians, supra note 74, at 1178-79 (noting that In re Mark C.H. relied upon the
CRPD). The CRPD has been relied upon by domestic state courts both before and after the
failed ratification vote. See e.g., In rc Guardianship of Damcris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 2012); In re Mark C.H, N.Y.S.2d at 433-34. See generally, Kristin Booth Glen,
Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (2012) (featuring an author who was the trial judge in Dameris
L. and Mark C. H. cases).
188
US CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE PCT20: GROUP QUARTERS POPULATION BY GROUP QUARTERS
TYPE,
available
at
http://factfindcr2.ccnsus.gov/faccs/tablescrvices/jsf/pagcs/
productvicw.xhtml?pid=DEC_ IO_SFI_PCT20&prodType=tablc (showing that 42,035 people
reside in "[ m ]ental (psychiatric) hospitals and psychiatric units in other hospitals").
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Institutional settings for people with mental disabilities are not just
limited to psychiatric hospitals-many are also housed in adult homes. 189
Moving people with disabilities from state mental hospitals to privately
owned board
and
care
homes
has
been
described
as
190
"transintitutionalization," which can be defined as "the transfer of a
population from one institutional system to another as an inadvertent
consequence of policies intended to deinstitutionalize the target
population." 191 These adult homes can be as isolative as inpatient units and
invoke similar feelings of shame for people who are forced to live there. 192
There have been litigation efforts to abate the negative outcomes of
this transinstitutionalization. By way of example, in Disability Advocates,
Inc. v. Patterson, a federal district court found that such "adult homes"
were institutions that impeded residents' community integration. 193 The
court further found that New York state homes had "denied thousands of
individuals with mental illness in New York City the opportunity to
receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs,"
and that these actions constituted discrimination in violation of Title II of
the ADA. 194 Although that decision was subsequently vacated on standing
grounds by the Second Circuit in an opinion that never touched on the
substance of the lower court's findings, 195 the state of New York
nevertheless subsequently signed a consent agreement which provides
funding for the development of 1050 supported housing units in Kings and
Queens counties, a development of a Community Transition Unit to
facilitate transitioning individuals with serious mental illness from
transitional adult homes to the community, and an independent reviewer to
ensure compliance. 196 Also, in Brooklyn Center for Independence of the

189
Kevin M. Cremin, Challenges to Institutionalization: The Definition of "Institution·· and the
Future ofOlmstcad Litigation. 17 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 143, 151-52 (2012).
190
/d. at 156.
191
Lois Weith om, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing
Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773, 805 (1988).
192
See Bryan A. Liang, Elder Abuse Detection in Nursing Facilities: Using Paid Clinical
Competence to Address the Nation's Shame, 39 J. HEALTH L. 527, 548 (2006) (discussing the
shame nursing homes cause).
193
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated,
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. N.Y. Coal. for Quality Assisted Living, Inc., 675 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.
2012).
194
!d. at 188.
195
Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled v. Bloomberg, 290 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
196
United States v. New York, Nos. 13-CV-4165 (NGG) (MDG), 13-CV-4166 (NGG)
(MDG), 2014 WL 1028982, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. March 17, 2014).
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Disabled v. Bloomberg, 197 a federal court certified a class action of over
900,000 individuals against the mayor and city of New York, alleging that
the city's emergency and disaster planning failed to address the needs of
persons with disabilities, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of
the ADA, and state human rights law. 198
Persons with mental disabilities continue to be housed in
institutions that are humiliating and induce feelings of shame despite
199
litigation efforts and the mandate of Title II of the ADA. However, full
integration of persons with mental disabilities into society in a way that
enhances dignity and reduces shame is required both under federal and
state law 200 and international human rights law. 201

F.

0UTPATIENT TREATMENT

Persons with mental disabilities are also subject to involuntary
outpatient treatment. This statutory mechanism that can be as humiliating
and shameful as inpatient hospital treatment, taking away the autonomy of
patients and residents by not giving them choices in their treatment and
living conditions. 202 In New York, this process of outpatient treatment is
popularly known as Kendra's Law, or Assisted Outpatient Treatment
("AOT"). 203 In New York, the law is used mainly in cases involving
persons with multiple hospitalizations.Z04 Persons are subject to AOT laws
in New York if they are over the age of eighteen, suffering from a mental
illness, deemed unlikely to survive in the community without supervision,
have a history of noncompliance with treatment, and have been

197

Brooklyn Ctr. for Independence of the Disabled, 290 F.R.D. at 417-21.
Id. at 412.
199
42 u.s.c. § 1210l(b) (2012).
200
Id. See e.g., Introduction to state laws-Protections compared to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, in I GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE MEDICAL LEAVE§ 6:1 (2014) (discussing how state
laws may be broader and further reaching than federal laws in this context); In re Harry M., 468
N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (noting that treatment must be "essential" to justify
commitment); In re Guardianship ofDameris L. 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853-54 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2012)
(noting that guardianship can only be required when it is the least restrictive alternative).
201
CRPD, supra note 7.
202
Rae E. Unzicker, From Privileges to Rights, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 171, 172-74 (2000).
203
See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW§ 9.60 (2012) (defining AOTs); Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment: Kendra's Law as Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 183, 194-95 (2003) (discussing Kendra's Law).
204
Henry A. Dlugacz, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment: Some Thoughts on Promoting a
Meaningful Dialogue Between Mental Health Advocates and Lawmakers, 53 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
REV. 79, 95-96 (2008).
198
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hospitalized at least twice in the prior thirty-six months or have been
accused of an act of serious violent behavior toward self or others in the
prior forty-eight months.Z05 AOT is similar to involuntary inpatient
treatment in that it forces a person to take certain medication, to live in a
particular place, and in some cases, attend certain outpatient clinics. 206
In theory, AOTs enable a person with mental illness to live in the
community by providing a case manager, psychiatrist, or residential
facilities or day treatment programs. 207 Offenders, however, may feel
coerced due to the judicial decree that they must comply with a prescribed
course of treatment or be "forcibly brought to an emergency room and
held in the hospital for seventy-two hours without the option of
leaving." 208 Of course, the mere fact that a patient is classified as
"voluntary" does not mean that the process is necessarily free from
coercion.Z09 AOTs also disproportionately coerce racial minorities into
involuntary treatment and forced drugging. 210 The court process can be
humiliating because it shames people who are hospitalized twice or more
in three years; such shaming in and of itself can discourage treatment and
"inspire distrust of the therapist, resentment, and lack of genuine

205

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §9.60(c).

206

/d.; see also Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337,344 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that an involuntarily
committed patient in a psychiatric hospital could not be medicated over his or her objection,
unless the hospital proved by clear and convincing evidence that the person suffers from a
mental illness, lacks capacity to make a reasoned decision, and that the proposed treatment was
the least restrictive alternative and in the patient's best interests). The Rivers v. Katz decision
docs not extend to AOTs in New York. See In rc K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480 (N.Y. 2004) (holding
that the threshold question as to capacity to make medical decisions was not required for an
AOT).
207

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW§ 9.60(a)(l).

208

Dlugacz, supra note 204, at 88; see a/so KATEY THOM ET AL., BALANCING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS WITH PUBLIC POLICY: THE DECISION-MAKING OF THE MENTAL HEALTH REVIEW
TRIBUNAL 15 (2014) (citing, Terry Carney & David Tail, Mental Health Tribunals-Rights,
Protection, or Treatment? Lessons From the ARC Linkage Grant Study?, 18 PSYCHIATRY
PSYCHOL. & L. 137, 145 (2011) (discussing how judicial hearings engender feelings of
powerlessness in persons with mental disabilities)).
209

Coercion is also often present in the allegedly voluntary civil commitment process as well.

See PERLIN, supra note 46, §§ 2C-7.2-7.2a, at 281-91 (discussing voluntary commitments);
Susan C. Reed & Dan A. Lewis, The Negotiation of Voluntary Admission in Chicago's State
Mental Hospitals, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 137, 148 (1990) (noting that the most common
method for a therapist to obtain consent is through "persuasion and coercion"). See generally
Birgit Yolmm, Coercive Measures in Psychiatry, Reactions by Patients and Staff (Oct. 28,
2013).
210

Dlugacz, supra note 204, at 82 (citing N.Y. LAWYERS FOR PUB. INTEREST,
IMPLEMENTATION OF "KENDRA'S LAW" IS SEVERELY BIASED II (2005), available at
http://www. prisonpolicy .org/scans/Kendras_Law_04-07-05 .pdf).
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cooperation."211 Further, mandating a person, who would not otherwise be
subject to forced medication, to take that medication against their will
devalues the person being served. 212 A judge, rather than ordering assisted
community treatment and "risk" having a patient potentially commit a
criminal act, will order more preventive commitments. 213 This sort of
rationalization feeds the misconception that persons with mental illness
are inherently more dangerous than others. 214
Persons with mental illness can conversely face involuntary
confinement because they do not meet eligibility requirements for AOTs.
Mental Disability Law Clinic v. Hogan/ 15 a class action lawsuit that
challenged the institutional aspect of AOTs, was brought on behalf of
individuals who face involuntary confinement because they do not meet
eligibility requirements for AOTs. 216 The plaintiffs alleged that "by failing
to authorize outpatient services to individuals who do not satisfy the
criteria for [AOTs]" the statute resulted in "unnecessarily segregating
mentally ill individuals."217 Although the case was ultimately dismissed,
the plaintiffs' arguments raise important questions as to whether AOTs are
truly the least restrictive alternative or whether persons with mental
illnesses should be offered similar outpatient services regardless of having
an AOT, and whether AOTs should continue only on a strictly voluntary
basis. 218
G. GUN CONTROL ISSUES

The response of the public, the press and the legislatures to recent
mass killings has been to assume a causal relationship between mental

211

Bruce J. Winick, Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 107, 120 (2003). A recent study in England found that community
treatment orders-similar to AOTs-are no better and no more prevention readmission to a
psychiatric hospital care than do other legal measures that allow patients short periods of lea vc
from psychiatric hospitals. See Tom Bums ct a!., Community Treatment Orders for Patients with
Psychosis (OCTET): A Randomised Controlled Trial, 381 LANCET 1627, 1631 (2013)
(discussing how there is no support to justify the significant curtailment of patients' personal
liberties).
212
Perlin, supra note 203, at 191.
213
Winick, supra note 211, at I 09.
214
Dlugacz, supra note 204, at 89; Winick, supra note 212, at I 07.
215
Mental Disability Law Clinic v. Hogan, No. CV-06-6320 (CPS)(JO), 2008 WL 4104460
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2008).
216 /d.
217
218

/d. at* 15.
See id. (noting how involuntary hospitalizations are more restrictive than outpatient care).
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illness and homicidal acts of violence. 219 This flawed "ordinary common
sense"220 persists notwithstanding the availability of valid and reliable
research that tells us diagnosis of a major mental disorder-especially a
diagnosis of schizophrenia-was associated with a lower rate of violence
than a diagnosis of a personality or adjustment disorder along with a co. d"1agnos1s o f substance abuse. 221
occurnng
The New York Secure Ammunitions and Firearms Enforcement
("SAFE") Act is a recent example of such reactionary legislation that
humiliates persons with mental disabilities. 222 Under a vague standard of
"likely to engage in conduct that would result in serious harm to self or
others,"223 the SAFE Act requires designated mental health professionals
to report such persons to the Division of Criminal Justice Services
("DCJS"), regardless of whether they are seeking treatment voluntarily or
involuntarily. 224 Not only does the SAFE Act apply to persons applying
for new licenses, but it also applies to licenses already issued. 225 Thus, if a
person with a mental disability legally owns a licensed gun, that person is
required to tum in the gun to law enforcement authorities?26 Moreover,
the names of the persons are entered in a database kept indefinitely by the
DCJS. 227
The potential unintended consequences from such legislation,
including damage to the therapeutic relationship between the patient and
provider and violations of a patient's right to privacy, have yet to be
0

219

Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism ", 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 388-89 (1992).
See Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 146, at 38 (citing Michael L. Perlin, "She Breaks Just Like a
Little Girl'": Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of Ordinary Common
Sense, I 0 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. ( 8 (2003)) ("[Ordinary common sense] is selfreferential and non-reflective ('I sec it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I sec it that
way, therefore that's the way it is."')).
221
The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, MACARTHUR RESEARCH NETWORK ON
MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW (available at http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html (last
accessed, Nov. I, 2013). "(I) Delusions. The presence of delusions-or the type of delusions or
the content of delusions-was not associated with violence. A generally "suspicious" attitude
toward others was related to later violence. (2) Hallucinations. Neither hallucinations in general,
nor "command" hallucinations per se, elevated the risk of violence. If voices specifically
commanded a violent act, however, the likelihood of violence was increased." /d.
222
The bill passed the New York State Senate on January 14, 2013, and the governor of New
York waived the legally required three day waiting period; it was passed by the State Assembly
and signed by the governor on January 15,2013. S.B. 2230,2013-2014 Reg. Scss. (N.Y. 2014).
223
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW§ 9.46 (2014).
224
S.B. 2230, 2013-2014 Reg. Scss.
225 /d.
226 !d.
220

227

/d. What is to be done with the database has yet to be seen.
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addressed in the legal literature. 228 A person seeking mental health
treatment has an expectation of privacy and confidentiality of their
medical treatment. 229 In the past, according to the Tarasoff decision, a
psychiatrist only would report a patient to the authorities or the potential
victim when "disclosure [was] essential to avert danger to others." 230 But,
the SAFE Act makes the threshold for disclosure much lower when
reporting the patient's information to the DCJS. 231 Further, it adds to the
misconception that persons with mental disabilities are inherently more
dangerous by assuming that taking away access to guns from persons
potentially suffering from a mental illness will end mass violence. 232
H. ISSUES INVOLVING ELDERS WITH COGNITIVE DEFICITS
The humiliation that persons with disabilities experience as a result of
their treatment is also shared by the elderly. Currently there are about
1,832,000 people living in skilled nursing facilities in the United States. 233

228

But see, Jeffrey Swanson, Mental Illness and New Gun Law Reforms: The Promise and Peril
of Crisis-Driven Policy, 309.12 JAMA 1233, 1233-34 (2013) (critiquing SAFE for problems of
over-identification, having a chilling effect on individuals who might otherwise have sought
treatment, and invasion of privacy).
229
Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9
(2012). There arc other exceptions to confidentiality, including a patient's decision to put his
mental state in issue in civil litigation, conflicts with police power statutes (such as those
criminalizing child abuse) and inquiries into such public welfare matters as an individual's
competency to operate a motor vehicle). See PERLIN, supra note 46, § 7A-5, at 333-34
("Psychiatrists, other mental health professionals, governmental officials, and mental health
centers have both a legal and ethical obligation to maintain secrecy in matters involving the
professional-parent relationship.").
230
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976). Tarasoff is not
universally accepted by all state courts. See PERLIN, supra note 46, § 7C-2.4h, at 479-81
("Several jurisdictions have declined to follow the California Supreme Court and impose a
Tarasoff duty to warn."). See also Mental Health Professionals· Duty to Protect/Warn, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/rcscarch/hcalth/mcnta]-hcalthprofcssionals-duty-to-warn.aspx (providing a state-by-state guide to recognition of Tarasojf)
(last visited Dec. 23, 2013).
231
S.B. 2230,2013-2014 Reg. Sess (N.Y. 2014).
232
Jana R. McCreary, "Mentally Defective" Language in the Gun Control Act, 45 CONN. L. REV
813, 842 (2013) (discussing the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968 and arguing that determining
who is irresponsible and dangerous has been done irresponsibly).
233
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 60 (2012}, available
at http://www.ccnsus.gov/compcndialstatab/2012/tablcs/12s0073.pdf. In 2004, I ,492,200 people
were in nursing homes. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2004 NATIONAL
NURSING HOME SURVEY 7, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nehs/datalnnhsd/Estimatcs/nnhs/
Estimatcs_PaymcntSouree_Tables.pdf. In the US Census Bureau 2000, 4,059,039 people were
living in institutions total (not distinguished between psychiatric hospitals and nursing homes).
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE I: TOTAL POPULATION IN HOUSEHOLDS AND GROUP QUARTERS
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This vulnerable population can be subject to abuse and neglect while
housed in nursing homes. 234 In a situation that parallels the problems
involving deinsitutitonalization of the mentally ill from psychiatric
hospitals, many elderly people are kept in nursing homes despite the
availability of residences in the community in which where they could live
with the support of community-based services. 235
I.

GUARDIANSHJPS

Guardianships may also be humiliating to any person subject to
236
them.
In many nations, entry of a guardianship order is the "civil death"
of the person affected. 237 It is so characterized:
because a person subjected to the measure is not only fully stripped of
their legal capacity in all matters related to their finance and property,
but is also deprived of, or severely restricted in, many other fundamental
rights, [including] the right to vote, the right to consent or refuse medical
treatment (including forced psychiatric treatment), freedom of
association and the right to marry and have a family. 238

Guardianships also can take away all the rights of allegedly
incapacitated persons, and can take away their dignity by stripping such
persons of any ability to make decisions for themselves. 239 Under the
BY SEX AND SELECTED AGE GROUPS FOR THE UNITED STATES, available
http://www .ccnsus.gov /population/www/ccn2000/bricfs/phc-t7 /tables/ grpqtrO I. pdf.
234

at

See. e.g., lain Johnson, Gay and Gray: The Need for Federal Regulation of Assisted Living
Facilities and the Inclusion of LGBT Individuals, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 293, 298 (2013)
(citing Patrick A. Bruce, The Ascendancy of Assisted Living: The Case for Federal Regulation,
14 ELDER L.J. 61, 69 (2006)) (reporting on a study specifically finding an "unprecedented
number" of reports of abuse of elderly residents within nursing homes, and noting further that
only forty percent of nursing homes met the minimum standards required by federal law).
235
Jennifer Matta, Informed Choice: Expanding Housing Options in an Aging Society, 48
WAYNE L. REV. 1503, 1522-23 (2003).
236
See Perlin, Guardians, supra note 74, at 1161-62 (noting how guardianships severely curtail
individual rights).
237
Anna Lawson, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:
New Era or False Dawn?, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 563, 569 (2007); see also Amita
Dhanda, Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or
Lodestar for the Future?, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 429, 445 (2007) (explaining "civil
death").
238
Oliver Lewis, New Project on Reforming Guardianship in Russia, MENTAL DISABILITY
ADVOC. CTR. (Aug. II, 2009), http://www.mdac.info/cn/content/new-project-reformingguardianship-russia.
239
See Perlin, Guardians, supra note 74, at I 168-70 (noting how guardianships can be abused);
see also CHINESE HUM. RTS. DEFENDERS, THE DARKEST CORNERS: ABUSES OF INVOLUNTARY
PSYCHIATRIC COMMITMENT IN CHINA 12 (2012), available at http://www.chrdnct.com/wpcontent/uploads/20 12/08/ CRPD_report_ FINAL-cditcd2.pdf ("Once individuals have been
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CRPD, substituted decision making should be abolished altogether. 240
Article 12 of the CRPD guarantees that persons with disabilities have the
right to recognition everywhere before the law. 241 The International
Disability Alliance, a network of global and regional organizations of
persons with disabilities, argues that the following must be abolished:
(I) plenary guardianship;
(2) unlimited time frames for exercise of guardianship;
(3) the legal status of guardianship as permitting any person to override
the decisions of another;
(4) any individual guardianship arrangement upon a person's request to
be released from it;
(5) any substituted decision-making mechanism that overrides a person's
own will, whether it is concerned with a single decision or a long-term
arrangement; and
(6) any other substituted decision-making mechanisms, unless the person
does not object, and there is a concomitant requirement to establish
supports in a person's life so they can eventually exercise full legal
capacity ?42

The CRPD requires the following actions to ensure equal
recognition before the law:
(I) States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to
recognition everywhere as persons before the law.
(2) States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.
(3) States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by
persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising
their legal capacity.
(4) States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise
of legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to
prevent abuse in accordance with international human rights law. Such
safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal
capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of
brought to psychiatric hospitals in China, hospital authorities and staff respond only to the
wishes and requests of those who authorized the commitment, not to the committed.").

°

24

CRPD, supra note 7, at 6; see also INTERNATIONAL DISABILITY ALLIANCE, PRINCIPLES FOR
IMPLEMENTATION
OF
CRPD
ARTICLE
12
3-4,
available
at
http://www.intemationaldisabilityalliance.org/sites/disalliance.e-prescntaciones.net/filcs/public/
files/Article_I2_Principlcs_Final.doc, (last accessed Nov. 23, 2013).
241

CRPD, supra note 7, at 10-11.

242

PRINCIPLES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF CRPD ARTICLE 12, supra note 240, at 3-4.
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conflict of interest and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to
the person's circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are
subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial
authority or judicial body. The safeguards shall be proportional to the
degree to which such measures affect the person's rights and interests.
(5) Subject to the provisions of this article, States Parties shall take all
appropriate and effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons
with disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their own financial
affairs and to have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and other
forms of financial credit, and shall ensure that persons with disabilities
are not arbitrarily deprived of their property .243

At the least, as Professor Arlene Kanter noted: "Instead of
parentalistic guardianship laws, which substitute a guardian's decision for
the decision of the individual, the CRPD's supported-decision making
model recognizes first, that all people have the right to make decisions and
choices about their own lives." 244
Guardianships are also seen as a violation of a mandate of the ADA
to provide services in the most integrated and least restrictive manner. 245
"Like institutionalization, guardianship entails the loss of civic
participation" and create a legal construct that parallels the isolation of
institutional confinement. 246 "When the state appoints a guardian and
restricts an individual from making his or her own decisions, the
individual loses crucial opportunities for interacting with others."247
Further, "there is evidence that guardianship often leads to
institutionalization. " 248
The fact that guardianships can lead to institutionalization only
increases the chances ofhumiliation.Z49 Moreover, the court guardianshipdetermination process itself can be humiliating as medical and personal
history are aired in public testimony. 250 Instead of substituted decision

243

CRPD, supra note 7, at 10-11.
Arlene Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities
and Its Implications for the Rights of Elderly People under International Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 527, 563 (2009); Perlin, Guardians, supra note 74, at 1176-79.
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making, assistance to persons in need of help with their day-to-day living
should be done in conjunction with their wishes and to afford them the
greatest amount of independence possible. Guardianship hearings should
be closed to anyone not directly involved in the case. Further, even private
medical testimony, which can be embarrassing to the person subject to the
guardianship, should be minimized in order to reduce potential feelings of
shame and humiliation.

J. SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS
I . Introduction
Sex offenders are arguably the most despised members of our society
and face the harshest condemnation.Z51 Regularly reviled as "monsters" by
district attorneys in jury summations, 252 by judges at sentencings, 253 by
254
.
. Iahve
. heanngs,
.
at Ieg1s
an d by th e me d.1a,255 t h e
e Iecte d representatives
commitment hearings).
251
See Sarah Geraghty, Challenging the Banishment of Registered Sex Offenders from the State
of Georgia: A Practitioner's Perspective, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513, 513-15 (2007)
(discussing the problems faced by sex offenders); Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the
1990's: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 505, 505 (1998)
(discussing how individuals who commit sex offenses against children arc probably the most
hated group in our society).
252
We have yet to find an appellate reversal of a case in which this inflammatory language was
used. See, e.g., Comer v. Schriro, 463 F.3d 934, 960 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 966
(2007) (upholding a decision even when a defendant had been referred to as a "monster" and
"filth" at trial); Kellogg v. Skon, 176 F.3d 447, 452 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding a decision even
when a defendant had been referred to a "monster and "sexual deviant" at trial); State v. Henry,
102 So. 3d 1016, 1025 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding a decision even when a defendant had
been referred to as a "monster" and "sexual predator" at trial); People v. Bonner, No. 10-0900120--CR, 2010 WL 3503858, at *II (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2010) (upholding a decision
even when a defendant had been referred to as a "child predator of the highest order" at trial).
253 See People v. Ball, No. 295851, 2011 WL 1086557, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2011)
(upholding a decision even when a defendant had been referred to as a "monster" and "coward"
by the trial judge).
254
See, e.g., Timothy Wind, The Quandary of Megan's Law: When the Child Sex Offender is a
Child, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 73, 93 (2003) (quoting Representative Mark Green); Daniel M.
Filler, Making the Case for Megan's Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315,339
(2001) (quoting Senator Hutchison).
255
See Rachel Rodriguez, The Sex Offender Under the Bridge: Has Megan's Law Run Amok?,
62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1023, 1031-32 (2010) (quoting John G. Winder, The Monster Next Door:
The Plague of American Sex Offenders, CYPRESS TIMES (Nov. 20, 2009, I :49 PM), http://
www.thccyprcsstimcs.com/articlc!Ncws/Your_Ncws/THE_MONSTER_NEXT_DOOR_THE_
PLAGUE_OF_AMERICAN_SEX_OFFENDERS/25925) ("There's no such thing as monsters.
We tell our kids that. The truth is that monsters are real. ... These monsters arc called Sex
Offenders, a label that is far too innocuous to convey the evil of those who have earned it."
(internal quotation marks omitted))
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demonization of this population has helped create a "moral panic"256 that
has driven the passage of legislation257-much of which has been found by
valid and reliable research to be counterproductive and engendering a
more dangerous set of conditions-and judicial decisions, at the trial,
intermediate appellate, and Supreme Court levels.Z58 These actions all
reflect the anger and hostility the public has for this population. 259
The government condones the use of humiliation as a remediative
tool through sex offender zoning restrictions and registries that bar sex
offenders from residing in certain communities or residing within a certain
distance from schools, parks, churches, recreational areas, or libraries. 260
These laws are so restrictive that in some cases there is no viable place left
for a sex offender to live except in a makeshift "shantytown" under a
bridge. 261 Sex offender registries require a person to notify the police and
the community of their crimes, while probation conditions for some sex
offenders require shaming conditions such as signs and bumper stickers. 262
These offenders are "forever branded with a 'scarlet letter'
notwithstanding the fact that they have already been criminally punished
for their offenses,"263 and have already served their sentences. 264

256

See STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 1-2 (3d cd. 2002); Filler, supra
note 254, at 317-20 ("Megan's Law reflects a recurring type of 'moral panic' .... "); Eric Fink,
Liars and Terrorists and Judges, Oh My: Moral Panic and the Symbolic Politics of Appellate
Review in Asylum Cases, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2019, 2038-39 (2008) (noting how moral
panics can have "serious and long-lasting repercussions").
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See Wayne Logan, Megan's Laws as a Case Study in Political Stasis, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV.
371, 371 (2011) (discussing "legislative panic" in context); Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the
Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1317, 1320 (1998) (same).
258

See John Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1119, 1146 (1999) (discussing "judicial panic" in context); David Karp, The Judicial and
Judicious Use of Shame Penalties, 44 CRIME & DELINQ. 277, 291 (1998) (discussing how shame
penalties that emphasize humiliation arc likely to be counterproductive as they "drive a wedge
between offenders and conventional society").
259

Mcghan Gilligan, It's Not Popular But It Sure Is Right: The (In)Admissibility of Statements
Made Pursuant to Sexual Offender Treatment Programs, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 255, 271
(2012); see also Kenneth Cloke, Revenge, Forgiveness, and the Magic of Mediation, II
MEDIATION Q. 67 (1993) ("[R]cvcngc is humiliating and degrading, even if it is also
satisfying.").
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2. Sex offender registration acts
Sex offender registration acts ("SORAs") are present in every state in
the US and have been met with resounding public support, despite their
prohibitive cost. 265 SORAs are rationalized under theories of deterrence
and protecting the public. 266 They are intended to shame sex offenders into
having greater respect for the law and create a powerful deterrent to
reoffending. 267
However, SORAs are based on flawed reasoning. They assume that
most sex offenses involve victims unfamiliar with their attackers and that
there is a correlation between how close an offender lives to a school and
increased recidivism. 268 "A study of the newspaper coverage of child
molesters arrested over the course of one year found that media coverage
tended to focus on the 'the extreme and unusual,' while the reporting of
typical cases, such as those involving family members or acquaintances,
was infrequent to non-existent." 269 Ninety percent of child sex offense
cases are committed by a family member or acquaintance of the child. 270
Thus, social proximity, not residential proximity, is the most significant
factor for sex offender recidivism. 271 Studies have demonstrated that
proximity to a school or playground has little effect on recidivism rates. 272
The public assumes that sex offenders recidivate at higher rates than other
criminals; 273 studies have shown that sex offenders recidivate at much
lower rates than commonly believed. 274
Research suggests that SORAs are not effective. 275 There is no
distinction between "those who will be dangerous in the future from those
who were formerly dangerous. Statutory rape cases [dealing] with sexual
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Amber Leigh Bagley, "An Era of Human Zoning": Banishing Sex Offenders From
Communities Through Residence and Work Restrictions, 57 EMORY L.J. 1347, 1376, 1391
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interactions between teenagers ... that would otherwise be consensual but
for age," are treated the same as cases dealing with "violent pedophilic
offenses." 276 Such a system is clearly unreliable and unfair. 277 In fact,
research indicates that SORAs do not protect children and might even
increase the danger to the community. 278
Empirical evidence demonstrates "that strong support networks are
among the most effective means of combating recidivism." 279 Sex
offenders need support systems comprised of people who accept their
potential for deviant behavior and empower them to engage in healthy,
law-abiding and respectful relationships and activities. 280 Studies have
shown a correlation between strong family ties and lower recidivism rates
for offenders reentering society.Z81 Moreover, restnctlve parole
supervision might not lead to lower recidivism rates. 282 The labeling and
stigmatization of sex offenders can have a disintegrative impact on the
offender's rehabilitation, which may ultimately make relapse more
likely.Z 83
Further, SORAs disproportionately affect low-income offenders and
cause them to be further isolated and marginalized from society because
they are forced to live far away from work opportunities. 284 Zoning
restrictions are severely detrimental to sex offenders and the community
because "[ s]table employment is an important part of preventing stress and
decreasing recidivism." 285 SORAs and zoning laws shame and stigmatize
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Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 146, at 21 (discussing how the current system "bundles statutory
rape cases that deal with sexual interactions between teenagers-interactions that would
otherwise be consensual but for the age of one of the partners-with cases of individuals who
have committed violent pedophilic offenses"); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-12-131 (20 14)
(discussing a driver who posted an allcgcdly-obsccnc bumper sticker and how that was
considered a sex offense); Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 Nw. U. L. REV.
1203, 1208 (1998) (discussing the imprecision and overbreadth of this category, ranging from
the stranger pedophiliac rapist to the teenager consensually sending "scxting" pictures of herself
to her boyfriend and how "sex offenders do not share a common set of psychological and
behavioral characteristics"). Preliminary studies indicate that approximately 20% of teenagers
have engaged in "scxting." See Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stinson, Juveniles, Sex
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sex offenders and deny them meaningful opportumtles for
rehabilitation. 286 They forever brand an offender with a '"scarlet letter'
notwithstanding the fact that they have already been criminally punished
for their offenses." 287 "With so many sex offenders struggling to find
suitable housing and being pushed away from their social networks, the
restrictions may actually be placing communities at an increased risk." 288
These schemes are so restrictive that they often drive sex offenders to
"disappear underground [or] to go across state lines."289
Homeowner associations have recorded covenants barring the sale of
homes to registered sex offenders.Z90 In Mulligan v. Panther Valley
Property Owners Association, a resident of a homeowner association
challenged the prohibition on the sale of her home to what is characterized
in New Jersey as a Tier 3 sex offender. 291 The court held that "the
restriction did not constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation"
because "there were only eighty Tier 3 sex offenders living in New Jersey
at the time," to whom the plaintiff could not sell her house. 292 It is also
telling that the exclusion of sex offenders by homeowner's associations
does not include exclusion of people convicted for other crimes like
murder, burglary, kidnapping, sedition, fraud, or theft. 293
In Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court rejected the respondent's
argument that Alaska's notification requirements resembled "shaming
punishments of the colonial period."294 The Court held that unlike shaming
punishments of the past, the stigma that resulted from Alaska's
notification requirements results from the dissemination of accurate
information about a criminal record, not "from public display for ridicule
and shaming."295 This was held despite the fact that the offender
286
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Bagley, supra note 265, at 1389 (quoting Mark Agee, No Room for Sex Offenders, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 28,2006, at AI).
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Lior Jacob Strahilcvitz, Information Assymetries and the Right to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1835, 1844-45 (2006).
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/d. (citing Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1189, 1192 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (discussing how Tier 3 is the highest classification in New Jersey
and is used to classify sex offenders whom the state has deemed to pose a high risk of
recidivating)).
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/d. at 1192.
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successfully completed a treatment program, gained early release,
subsequently remarried, established a business, reunited with his family,
and was granted custody of a minor child based on a judge's determination
that he had been successfully rehabilitated.Z96 Further, the offender's
registration pursuant to SORNA is unlikely to increase public safety since
SORNA does not thwart the victimization of those in close, trusting
relationships as exemplified by an offender who was convicted of sexually
abusing his daughter. 297
But, even in light of the Supreme Court's approval of Smith's
notification requirements, it is more difficult to justify the use of other
shaming sanctions, such as forcing sex offenders to post signs or affix a
bumper sticker to their cars. 298 These shaming conditions affix labels
against the offenders and may cause feelings of hopelessness that could
cause them to engage in deviant behavior. 299 It also leads to public
humiliation, which cannot be seen as an acceptable goal of probation, 300
unlike rehabilitation of the offender and protection of the community. 301
Because of these shaming conditions, sex offenders often find
themselves and their families threatened. 302 In July 2000, News of the
World (a garish British tabloid) developed the "Name and Shame"
campaign which outed suspected and known pedophiles and printed their
photographs and addresses along with brief details of their alleged
offending history? 03 Angry protestors issued threats against the alleged
pedophiles, and overturned and burned cars. 304 Several families were
forced to flee, one convicted pedophile disappeared, two alleged
pedophiles committed suicide, and one person's house was attacked
merely because she shared her surname with a known sex offender. 305 The
moral panic associated with sex offenders is primarily due to the media's
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296
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depiction of them. 306
By shaming and humiliating convicted sex offenders, sex offender
residency restrictions ostracize, isolate, and destroy any hope of
reintegration, and may even increase the likelihood of recidivism. 307
SORAs provoke feelings of being less than human, hopelessness,
unworthiness, and results in a lack of dignity. 308 As Professor Michelle
Alexander has noted, "some convicted felons and registered sex offenders
have found the 'lifetime of shame, contempt, scorn, and exclusion' that
follows the actual sentence to be the most difficult aspect of their
conviction." 309 With the imposition of serious penalties following teenage
"sexting" (the sending of sexually explicit images or messages via cellular
phone), one commentator has concluded, "[s]tripping teens of democratic
rights, erecting roadblocks to their future careers, and subjecting them to a
'lifetime of shame' is not consistent with the central aim of the juvenile
justice system-rehabilitation."310 Not only are these actions demeaning,
they may also unconstitutionally infringe upon the freedom of speech, the
freedom of association, the right to privacy, the right to work, the takings
clause, and the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, all while
being unconstitutionally vague. 311
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, THE
ROLE OF DIGNITY AND HUMILIATING/SHAMING SANCTIONS

As noted earlier, TJ aims to determine whether legal rules, procedure,
and lawyer roles can be reshaped to enhance therapeutic potential while
not subordinating due process principles. 312 Recall the "three Vs" listed by
Professor Ronner in her discussion of TJ: voice, validation, and
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voluntariness, 313 and also consider how our humiliating and shaming
strategies reject these values. Scarlet letter punishments do not meet the
three Vs and are in direct contravention of TJ principles and the
development of problem-solving courts. 314 Although problem-solving
courts developed separately from TJ, they share similar aims. 315 Instead of
shaming and humiliating people, courts should use the law as an
instrument for helping people and should function as psychosocial
agencies. 316 Judges need to be good listeners and avoid trite paternalism
in the lecturing and shaming of offenders. 317 TJ and problem-solving
courts should also be employed for persons with mental disabilities subject
to A0Ts. 318 "Judges, court personnel, treatment providers, and defense
attorneys should take care to instruct the [offenders] carefully and
understandably concerning [their] obligations relating to participation in
the treatment program and reporting to court."319 Most importantly, an
offender should not feel coerced into treatment or into agreeing to
has rejected criminal
probation. 32 For example, a Minnesota statute
sanctions for prenatal substance abuse as well as the classification of drug
use during pregnancy as child abuse, 321 and has been lauded as "a model
for other states, replacing ineffective punitive measures that deter pregnant
substance abusing women from obtaining treatment and that encourage
these women to feel guilt and shame."322
Some argue that shaming is a necessary part of TJ. 323 However,
reintegrative shaming differs from the humiliating tactics currently
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315
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employed by courts. 324 Namely, the cornerstone of reintegrative shaming
is the voluntary participation of victims and offenders. 325 The idea of
reintegrative shaming is to have enough shame to "bring home the
seriousness of the offense, but not so much to humiliate and harden."326
Further it is directed at the evil of the act, rather than the evil of the
person. 327
Nothing so clearly violates "the dignity of persons as treatment that
demeans or humiliates them" as shaming. 328 Thus, by way of specific
examples of marginalized populations, the treatment of persons with
mental disabilities and the elderly must be radically changed. 329 Persons
with mental disabilities should be entitled to the right to receive treatment
in a way that does not isolate them and invoke feelings of shame while the
elderly should be given the most opportunity to make decisions regarding
their personal needs and property and afforded the greatest amount of
independence.
Instead of laws that aim to shame, isolate and humiliate sex
offenders, the focus must be on reintegrating sex offenders into society
and promoting sex offenders' self-respect and dignity while fostering
family and community relationships. 330 "Residency restrictions should be
completely dismantled due to their anti-therapeutic effect and unfounded
ability to have any impact on diminishing re-offense and making
communities safer." 331 The perception of receiving a fair hearing is
therapeutic because it contributes to the individual's sense of dignity and
conveys that he or she is being taken seriously."332 The shaming and
humiliating practices discussed throughout this Article fail miserably at
achieving the goals of TJ.
Finally, the CRPD declares a right to "freedom from ... degrading
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treatment or punishment, " 333 and a "respect for inherent dignity. " 334 It
promotes "awareness throughout society, including at the family level,
regarding persons with disabilities, and to foster respect for the rights and
dignity of persons with disabilities." 335 An understanding of dignity is
absolutely central to an understanding of the intersection between
international human rights and mental disability law. 336 The punishments
described in this paper contravene international human rights law and
deprive individuals of dignity through their degradation and therefore
must be changed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The law regularly shames and humiliates those who come before it.
As has been illustrated throughout this Article, there is little reliable
evidence that these approaches "work" in the sense of lowering
recidivism, making the streets safer, or creating a more humane society.
Often, the individuals who are so shamed and humiliated are either
despised, like sex offenders, convicted of criminal charges, again like sex
offenders, or ignored, like those who are institutionalized for mental
disabilities. As a result, there is rarely outcry when these individuals'
rights are violated. In all cases, the shaming and humiliating tactics
deprive them of dignity, and, in the cases of individuals with disabilities,
contravene the CRPD. 337 Most importantly, they violate the cardinal
principle of dignity that is central to TJ. 338
This Article hopes to call attention to these rights violations, and that
it causes those who support them to think more carefully about the impact
that the tactics in question have on the persons being shamed and
humiliated. Recall again what Dylan critic Michael Gray had to say about
Jokerman, the song from which the first part of the title of this Article is
derived: that "'evil' is not 'out there,' 'among the others,' but is inside us
333
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334
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all." 339 We close our eyes to this reality, and that allows us to humiliate
and shame others that we often treat as subhuman. It is time to
acknowledge this, and end these behaviors.

339
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